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Telling a Less Suspicious
Story: Notes Toward a NonSkeptical Approach to
Legal/Cultural Analysis
Paul Schiff Berman*
Those of us who labor in academia— either in law
or in the humanities— are, at a very basic level,
storytellers. Both in my scholarly writing and in
the classroom, I find that most of my effort is
focused on constructing narratives of meaning
from the complicated and multifaceted material
that makes up our lived reality. Philosopher
Wilhelm Dilthey wrote that “ reality only exists
for us in the facts of consciousness given by
inner experience.” 1 But for every experience
there is a wide range of possible meanings that
can be assigned. And for every possible meaning
there is a range of stories we can tell. As
anthropologist Edward Bruner has pointed out, “ If
we write or tell about the French Revolution, for
example, we must decide where to begin and where
to end, which is not so easy, so that by our
arbitrary construction of beginnings and endings
we establish limits, frame the experience, and
thereby construct it.” 2 On this view, “ Every
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1. WILHELM DILTHEY: SELECTED WRITINGS 161 (H.P. Rickman ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1976).
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ANTHROPOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE 3, 7 (Victor W. Turner & Edward M. Bruner
eds., 1986).
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telling is an arbitrary imposition of meaning on
the flow of memory . . . every telling is
interpretive.” 3 Thus, although we may not always
be conscious of it, scholars are constantly
engaged in the process of articulating a vision
both of our culture and of the nature and shape
of reality itself.
Moreover, I’m not sure that I at least am able
to say definitively that any particular vision is
necessarily the most “ accurate.” Certainly, if a
scholar argued that the United States government
consisted of Martians who were inhabiting the
bodies of our national leaders, we might think
that such a narrative was so removed from the
everyday experience of most people that it was
unhelpful. But, in the main, I find that there
are a wide variety of critical stances available
about any given subject and that it cannot
necessarily be said that one approach is more
“ true” than another.4
If there are a range of plausible critical
stances available about any given subject, then
it
is
not
inevitable
that
we
choose
one
perspective over another. So how do I, as someone
embarking on a project aimed at discussing law’s
role in American culture, choose the type of
story I wish to tell? What sort of critical
stance
should
I
adopt,
and
what
are
the
ramifications— political,
psychological,
spiritual— of
that
choice?
These
are
the
questions I wish to explore in this Essay. In the
end, I will pursue the possibility of viewing law
in an extremely sympathetic light, as a useful
forum for discourse among multiple worldviews.
Other scholars, of course, have provided more
skeptical accounts of law’s pervasive cultural
influence. I will examine some of these accounts
as well and offer reasons why, though much of
this scholarship has been extremely useful, I
wish to move in a different direction. But
regardless of the critical stance one ultimately
adopts, I hope that, simply by musing about these
questions in a fairly personal way, I will
encourage others to consider the ethical choices
inherent in their own scholarship as well.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL
ANALYSIS xviii (1989) (proclaiming that “ classic modes of analysis,
which in their pure type rely exclusively on a detached observer
using a neutral language to study a unified world of brute facts, no
longer hold a monopoly on truth. Instead, they now share
disciplinary authority with other analytical perspectives” ).
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Nevertheless, before beginning I must first
acknowledge that, merely by conceiving of one’s
critical perspective as a choice, I may have
already committed myself to a particular point of
view. For example, some might question just how
free the choice of stories actually is. Our
critical perspectives are, of course, influenced
by
many
factors,
including
psychological
predispositions, cultural and class backgrounds,
concerns about career advancement, etc. Or, one
might go even further and contend that the very
idea of a free choice is illusory because
embedded
cultural
and
political
forces
may
determine our choices without our conscious
knowledge.5
Part of the point of this Essay, however, is to
suggest that we might want to resist precisely
this type of argument on the ground that such a
perspective
is
ultimately
disempowering,
debilitating, and insufficiently useful from a
pragmatic point of view. In addition, it seems
reasonable to think that, at least as compared to
most of the population, tenured academics are
among the most free to choose their own critical
stance. Nevertheless, I readily admit that the
“ choice” on which I focus may be constrained in
significant ways. Even with this caveat, though,
I believe that it may still be useful to think
self-reflectively about the critical perspectives
we generally take and consider to what extent
other possibilities exist. This exploration will
necessarily be a personal one for each of us, but
I think it is essential that we remember
periodically to ask such questions about the
kinds of stories we tend to tell.
* * *
In the generation of law and society research
that emerged with the formation of the Law and
Society
Association,
sociolegal
scholars,
building
on
the
legal
realist
attack
on
formalism, told a story primarily about the
possibility of social progress through law. Law
was seen in instrumental terms as a means to a
more just society, and scholars focused on the
“ gaps” between legal doctrine and legal practice
in order to foster reform.
Over the past two decades, however, sociolegal
5. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1627 (1991).
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scholars have become increasingly disenchanted
with
the
reformist
project.
These
writers,
influenced
by
Michel
Foucault
and
other
postmodern theorists, have begun to see law not
as an instrument for dispensing justice, but as a
constitutive
societal
force
shaping
social
relations, constructing meaning, and defining
categories of behavior. Such a constitutive
theory of law takes seriously Clifford Geertz’s
observation that law is not simply an instrument
for enforcing a system of morality or justice but
is also “ part of a distinctive manner of
imagining the real.” 6 Accordingly, scholars have
emphasized that law cannot be distinguished from
the rest of social life; rather, “ law permeates
social life, and its influence is not adequately
grasped by treating law as a type of external,
normative
influence
on
independent,
ongoing
activities.” 7 As Paul Kahn has written recently,
echoing a generation of critical legal scholars,8
“ We experience the rule of law not just when the
policeman stops us on the street or when we
consult a lawyer on how to create a corporation.
The rule of law shapes our experience of meaning
everywhere and at all times. It is not alone in
shaping meaning, but it is rarely absent.” 9
As part of the move to view law as a
constitutive force in social relations, many
sociolegal scholars have chosen to go even
farther and emphasize law’s role as a pervasive
form of social control. On this view, “ Law
constrains not by force but by creating the very
categories of action that define social life.” 10
Law is seen as inherently “ implicated in the
maintenance
of
inequality
rather
than
its
amelioration.” 11 Accordingly, the focus of more
recent sociolegal scholarship often involves
uncovering how law’s coercive power is inscribed
6. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
167, 184 (1983).
7. Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Justice and Power in Law and
Society Research: On the Contested Careers of Core Concepts, in
JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 1, 3 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin
Sarat eds., 1997) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND POWER].
8. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 242-68
(1987); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV.
57 (1984); Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
9. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
124 (1999).
10. Nancy Reichman, Power and Justice in Sociolegal Studies of
Regulation, in JUSTICE AND POWER, supra note 7, at 233, 250.
11. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 8.
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in all legal discourse and practice.
This is certainly one possible story to be told
about the constitutive power of law, but I wonder
if there are others. For example, might we tell a
story
that
emphasizes
law’s
generative
possibilities, one that envisions law not merely
as an instantiation of embedded power, but as an
activity that might have true intellectual,
imaginative,
ethical,
and
political
value?
Moreover, could we tell this story while still
embracing a constitutive theory of law, and while
refusing to return either to legal formalism or
to the instrumental reformist vision of the first
generation of law and society scholarship? And,
if we can imagine such an alternative story, why
might we choose to tell that story, rather than
adopt the more familiar sociolegal focus on law
as hegemonic discourse?
These questions form the basis of a larger
project that I am just beginning, and so my aim
in
this
Essay
is
to
take
a
frankly
impressionistic, unsystematic “ first cut”
at
them. Such issues are of particular interest to
me as an emerging scholar seeking a way both to
embrace
the
antifoundational
insights
characteristic of postmodern thought and to
acknowledge law’s role as a discourse of cultural
meaning, while at the same time trying to
articulate a more optimistic and pragmatic story
about law’s power and potential.
But before attempting to articulate such a
vision, it is necessary to examine the more
skeptical story and to try to speculate about how
that story came to be so dominant in cultural and
sociolegal discourse. In this regard, it may be
useful
to
reconsider
Paul
Ricoeur’s
famous
analysis of the “ hermeneutics of suspicion.” 12
Ricoeur discussed the work of three influential
thinkers: Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. According
to Ricoeur, Nietzsche believed that human beings
are in a constant state of deluding themselves
that
they
actually
possess
foundational
knowledge; Marx attempted to show that all
societal institutions and ideological constructs
were the product of economic relations; and Freud
explained human behavior in terms of underlying
unconscious impulses and desires. Thus, all three
employed what Ricoeur called the hermeneutics of
suspicion. According to Ricoeur, this approach is
12. PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 32-36
(Dennis Savage trans., Yale Univ. Press 1970).
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characterized by the desire to unmask, demystify,
and expose the real from the apparent. Although
Ricoeur’s ideas on this topic have been widely
disseminated, I will review them briefly in Part
One of this Essay.
It seems to me that the move in law and society
scholarship away from a legal-realist-inspired
reform agenda toward a focus on law as a
pervasive and inescapable force in defining
social relations can be viewed as an ongoing
elaboration
of
this
same
hermeneutics
of
suspicion. In Part Two, I will sketch the
evolution in sociolegal scholarship toward an
ever more suspicious critical stance. Because it
is beyond the scope of this Essay to attempt a
systematic review of such scholarship, I will use
as an illustrative case study a recent volume of
essays, Justice and Power in Sociolegal Studies,
edited by Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat.13 This
collection exemplifies the constitutive view of
law, and by examining several of the essays, we
can perhaps begin to see how the skeptical
approach operates more generally in contemporary
sociolegal scholarship.
The hermeneutics of suspicion obviously has much
to recommend it, and we have all learned a
tremendous amount from the efforts of scholars to
expose the pervasive discourse of power that may
underlie lofty rhetoric, “ neutral” philosophical
systems, or even well-intentioned efforts at
reform. In law, for example, sociolegal scholars
have worked successfully not only to question the
ability of the legal system to live up to its
ideals, but also to challenge “ the very ideals
and principles that law claims for itself.” 14
There can be little doubt that this suspicious
stance has yielded substantial fruit. I emphasize
this point because I do not want this Essay to be
misread as yet another polemic against postmodern
critical theory.
Nevertheless, the question remains: Do we always
want to tell a story that seeks to challenge “ the
very ideals and principles that law claims for
itself” ?15 And, if we choose to tell a different
13. JUSTICE AND POWER, supra note 7.
14. Susan S. Silbey, Ideology, Power, and Justice, in JUSTICE AND
POWER, supra note 7, at 272, 274.
15. This question raises, in a different context, the issue of
“ double consciousness”
first identified by W.E.B. DuBois to
describe the African-American experience. See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS
OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903) (“ The Negro is . . . born with a veil, and
gifted with second-sight. . . . [In] this double-consciousness . . .

273517

2001]

06/24/01 1:37 PM

Berman

107

story, must we jettison the constitutive view of
law altogether? In Part Three of the Essay, I
explore
two
potential
drawbacks
of
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion.
First,
such
an
approach may situate the writer (and perhaps the
reader as well) in a superior position to those
who are the objects of study. By unmasking
ideologies and power dynamics unacknowledged by
those
participating
in
the
systems
being
analyzed, the writer may imply that he or she is
able to get beyond the mystification and see the
situation more accurately than those caught
“ within”
the system.16 Thus, for example, a
critical scholar might attempt to show that, even
when litigants report their satisfaction with the
procedural justice system, such reports are
unreliable because the litigants are unwittingly
in the thrall of the legal system’s dominance.
Likewise,
a
critic
who
views
law
as
a
constitutive language may focus on the inherent
power relations within that language, regardless
of the subjective intentions of the participants
who are actually engaged in the discourse. This
type of analysis may, by its very nature, suggest
that the writer has discerned a truth unavailable
[o]ne ever feels his two-ness,— American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals. . . .” ).
Although we need not deny the coercive power of law, we may
simultaneously recognize that law also provides a language and
structure from which to construct alternative worlds. Ultimately, we
might insist on such a double consciousness: recognizing both the
persistence of oppression and the potentially generative nature of
law.
In his seminal essay, Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover argued that
law functions in part “ as a system of tension or a bridge linking a
concept of a reality to an imagined alternative.” Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term— Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 9 (1983). On this view, law is a language that allows us
to
discuss,
imagine,
and
ultimately
even
perhaps
generate
alternative worlds spun from present reality. Thus, Cover envisioned
law as that which connects “ reality” to “ alternity.” Robert M.
Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 176 (Martha Minow,
Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat 1992) (citing G. STEINER, AFTER BABEL 222
(1975)). If Cover’s vision is correct, then law has enormous
potential as a creative and transformative language. Building on
this vision, my ultimate goal is to see whether one can use the idea
of law as generative discourse to develop a more optimistic story
about law’s role. It seems to me that this story should, at the very
least, sit alongside the suspicious one in our consciousness about
law.
16. Thomas Morawetz, among others, has explored in detail the
question of an “ inside”
versus an “ outside”
perspective in
critical theory. See, e.g., Thomas Morawetz, Law as Experience:
Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 27 (1999);
Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, the Root Issue of
Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory,
and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1992) [hereinafter Morawetz,
Understanding Disagreement].
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to those who are participating in the social
practice. Such a perspective may not give
sufficient value to the lived reality of those
participants
and
may
therefore
provide
a
distorted picture of the social practice itself.17
Second, and perhaps even more importantly,
relentless
practice
of
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion may, over time, have a corrosive effect
both on our psyches and on society as a whole.
What does it mean for us to be consistently
skeptical of all human efforts to make the world
more just, more beautiful, or more joyful? In
what ways might skepticism discourage such noble
striving? To tell stories of beauty, of optimism,
and of hope might be a profoundly important task
in and of itself. And, even from the more
earthbound perspective of political mobilization,
a less suspicious story might actually be more
effective at achieving social reform. As Richard
Rorty has recently argued,
Those who hope to persuade a nation to exert
itself need to remind their country of what it
can take pride in as well as what it should be
ashamed of. They must tell inspiring stories
about episodes and figures in the nation’s
past— episodes
and
figures
to
which
the
country should remain true.18
Thus, from both a spiritual and a pragmatic
standpoint, we may wish to adopt a sympathetic
reading rather than a suspicious one, and to
emphasize what is worthwhile in the efforts of
people
to
construct
ideas,
systems,
or
principles, flawed though they might be. We must
remember that, if the ideas of law and justice
are inherently compromised by the practice of
power and ideology, it may become more difficult
even to envision a satisfactory response short of
revolution.
Having
discussed
some
limitations
to
the
hermeneutics of suspicion, this Essay then offers
notes toward a less skeptical approach to
17. Of course, the problems that may result from taking a “ God’seye view” are inherent in almost all scholarship, regardless of
whether or not one takes a particularly suspicious critical stance.
Nevertheless, a scholar who views the lived experience of
participants empathetically may be less likely to discount that
experience. In contrast, if one specifically sets out to unmask
aspects of culture that are hidden to the participants, these
problems may be more acute.
18. RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 3-4 (1998).
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legal/cultural analysis. This approach builds on
Ronald Dworkin’s theory of how judges reach legal
conclusions.19 According to Dworkin, the legal
decision-making process is akin to a group of
authors constructing a chain novel. In adding
each new chapter, the author must interpret the
work of the other authors in the preceding
chapters so as to make of the overall shared
enterprise the best work of art possible. Whether
or not Dworkin is correct in his interpretation
of
judicial
decision-making,
I
believe
his
analysis holds much promise as an attitude with
which to undertake scholarly criticism. Rather
than attempting to debunk, unmask, and demystify
a particular legal or cultural practice and tell
a story that makes the practice seem more
oppressive than before, we might instead seek an
interpretation that makes the best case on behalf
of the practice, and that makes it into the best
practice it can be, at least according to the
values and philosophies of the critic.20
In conclusion, I offer one possible alternative
story as an example of the type of less skeptical
scholarship I have in mind. Significantly, this
story also derives from the constitutive theory
of law. And it resists the move, championed by
some communitarian critics, to return to a prerelativist world where one version of truth was
to
be
considered
authoritative.
Rather,
I
emphasize law21 as a potentially generative site
19. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
20. It is important to make clear at the outset that the
distinction I am attempting to draw between hermeneutic approaches
is not the same as the distinction between scholarship that
criticizes a legal practice and scholarship that supports it. For
example, one could imagine a law and economics scholar making an
argument along the following lines: “ The judge may have thought she
was deciding the case based on X, but really she was promoting
efficient economic relations, and we are all better off because she
did so.” Such an analysis would be suspicious as I am using the
term because it seeks to unmask the practice being studied, even
though it ultimately takes a position in favor of the decision. On
the other hand, one could take a less skeptical approach by
attempting to make the best possible case on behalf of a judicial
decision, yet still conclude that the decision is incorrect. Thus,
suspicious scholarship is not necessarily negative scholarship, nor
is less suspicious scholarship necessarily positive.
21. When I refer to “ law” in this Essay, I mean something very
broad indeed. Not only do I refer to formal legal rules and
procedures, but also to “ quasi-legal” discourses and practices that
sometimes straddle the law/entertainment boundary. See, e.g., Austin
Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in
The Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 5-10 (2000) (arguing that
sociolegal scholars must “ take on” cultural studies by considering
how law exists in a world of film and television images); Alison
Young, Murder in the Eyes of the Law, 17 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 31, 31
(1997) (exploring how law “ appears and reappears in the cinematic
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for the play of discourses and the encounter with
the Other.
The approach I suggest need not replace the more
suspicious story altogether. Indeed, it should go
without saying that there are multiple stories to
be told, and any and all of them are likely to be
useful at one time or another.22 In addition, my
text” ); see generally Richard K. Sherwin, Symposium, Picturing
Justice: Images of Law & Lawyers in the Visual Media: Introduction,
30 U.S.F. L. REV. 891 (1996). These include television court
channels, legal talk shows, legal “ thriller” novels and films,
public memorials and ceremonies (such as the monument to victims of
the Oklahoma City bombing or candlelight vigils to build community
after hate crimes), and marches on Washington (such as the “ Million
Mom March” to lobby for stricter handgun regulations).
Even more broadly, my invocation of law is meant to refer to the
often unnoticed practice of “ law talk” in the society at large. By
law talk, I mean the use of legal concepts in everyday language.
Such talk includes abstract (and often inchoate) ideas of street
justice, due process, civil disobedience, retribution, deterrence,
and rights, all of which are frequently invoked both in public
discussions
and
dinner-table
conversations
alike.
Indeed,
I
deliberately use a conception of law aimed at expanding the law’s
generic constraints to encompass a broader spectrum of discourses
talking in the “ shadow” of official legal categories, but talking
law nonetheless. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 20 (1998) (“ Legality . . . operates
through social life as persons and groups deliberately interpret and
invoke law’s language, authority, and procedures to organize their
lives and manage their relationships. In short, the commonplace
operation of law in daily life makes us all legal agents insofar as
we actively make law, even when no formal legal agent is
involved.” ).
The great variety of discourses that might be brought under the
rubric of “ law talk” not only attests to the conceptual power of
law
in
the
collective
American
consciousness,
but
also
simultaneously underscores the elusiveness of the very concept of
“ law.”
For example, even relatively well-established forms of
“ alternative”
dispute
resolution,
such
as
mediation
and
arbitration, are accepted by many legal practitioners as legitimate
quasi-legal mechanisms; to others, however, they are viewed as
antithetical, even subversive to canonical law practice. This is
merely one example of the way in which a narrow definition of “ law”
can serve as a hegemonic arbiter of what counts as sanctioned legal
practice. Thus, a methodical definition of “ law”
is not only
unlikely to be satisfying, but it also may tend to privilege certain
understandings of law over others. In any event, attempting such a
definition is a project far beyond the scope of this Essay.
Accordingly, although I refer to “ law” and “ legal” discourse
liberally, I do so with invisible quotation marks around them in
order to acknowledge their broad interpretation and application. Cf.
id. at 22 (choosing to use the term “ legality” rather than “ law”
to describe a broader set of “ meanings, sources of authority, and
cultural practices that are commonly recognized as legal, regardless
of who employs them or for what ends” ).
22. My focus on “ usefulness” as the criterion for choosing among
critical approaches echoes some of the core insights of pragmatist
philosophy. See RICHARD RORTY, Truth Without Correspondence to
Reality, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 23, 27 (1999), (“ Pragmatists—
both classical and ‘neo-’— do not believe that there is a way things
really are. So they want to replace the appearance-reality
distinction by that between descriptions of the world and of
ourselves which are less useful and those which are more useful.” ).
For further discussion of pragmatism, critical theory, and law, see
Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, supra note 16, at 443-49. See
generally THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); Steven
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discussion
here
only
begins
to
raise
the
complicated question of how one decides, in any
given circumstance, whether to adopt a suspicious
or sympathetic approach. Nevertheless, I think
that, simply by recognizing the possibility of
alternatives, we will open a creative space for
such a self-reflective question, which may be a
positive development in and of itself.
For myself, I ultimately choose to tell a story
that may help remind us what is best about our
nation’s legal environment, and instill a sense
of optimism about our ongoing shared enterprise.
I neither expect nor desire that all scholars
embrace the same perspective. Rather, I suggest
only that our critical stance is, in part, an
ethical choice and that we should each consider
the subtle but significant ramifications of the
types of stories that we tell.
I. PAUL RICOEUR AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION
Paul Ricoeur speaks not of stories but of
hermeneutics. Yet his inquiry is similar: What
are the methodological principles we use to
interpret and describe reality? Although it is
beyond the scope of this Essay to attempt a
comprehensive analysis of Ricoeur’s discussion of
hermeneutic styles, I believe it may be useful to
invoke Ricoeur’s categories briefly, because they
can provide a framework for considering trends in
sociolegal scholarship.
Ricoeur contrasts two different “ poles” among
hermeneutic styles. At one pole, “ hermeneutics is
understood as the manifestation and restoration
of . . . meaning.” 23 At the other pole,
hermeneutics is “ understood as a demystification,
as a reduction of illusion.” 24 It is not entirely
clear to me precisely what Ricoeur means by these
two categories. Nevertheless, I understand a
hermeneutics of faith to be one that treats the
object of study as possessing inherent meaning on
its own terms. In contrast, the hermeneutics of
suspicion seeks to expose societal practices as
illusory
edifices
that
mask
underlying
contradictions or failures of meaning. I will
return to the first pole in Part Four of this
D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Peter
D. Swan, Critical Legal Theory and the Politics of Pragmatism, 12
DALHOUSIE L.J. 349 (1989); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
23. RICOEUR, supra note 12, at 27.
24. Id.
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Essay, but for now I wish to focus on the
hermeneutics of demystification and suspicion.
Ricoeur locates in the work of Nietzsche, Marx,
and
Freud
the
central
hallmarks
of
this
suspicious approach. He argues that each of these
thinkers makes “ the decision to look upon the
whole of consciousness primarily as ‘false’
consciousness.” 25 Ricoeur sees this perspective as
an extension of Descartes’ fundamental position
of doubt at the dawn of the Enlightenment.
According to Ricoeur, “ The philosopher trained in
the school of Descartes knows that things are
doubtful, that they are not such as they appear;
but he does not doubt that consciousness is such
as it appears to itself; in consciousness,
meaning and consciousness of meaning coincide.” 26
The hermeneutics of suspicion takes doubt one
step
farther,
by
distrusting
even
our
perceptions.
This suspicious position questions the so-called
“ correspondence theory”
of truth. As we go
through our lives, most of us generally assume
that our mental perceptions accord with reality
because we believe we have direct access to
reality through our senses or through reason.
This is the legacy of the Enlightenment, the
“ answer” to the fundamental Cartesian doubt. But
the hermeneutics of suspicion maintains that
human beings create false truths for themselves.
Such false truths cannot be “ objective” because
they always serve some interest or purpose.
By discovering and revealing those interests or
purposes, suspicious analysis seeks to expose socalled “ false consciousness” generated through
social
ideology
or
self-deception.
False
consciousness may arise in many different ways.
Nietzsche looked to people’s self-deceit in the
service of the “ will to power.” Marx focused on
the social being and the false consciousness that
arises from ideology and economic alienation.
Freud
approached
the
problem
of
false
consciousness by examining dreams and neurotic
symptoms in order to reveal hidden motivations
and desires. Thus, “ the Genealogy of Morals in
Nietzsche’s sense, the theory of ideologies in
the Marxist sense, and the theory of ideas and
illusions
in
Freud’s
sense
represent
three
convergent procedures of demystification.” 27
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 34.
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Although these three “ masters of suspicion”
aim to destroy false consciousness, they do so in
the service of greater consciousness. For all
three,
there
is
some
better,
healthier
perspective to which we should aspire. As Ricoeur
points out, they are attempting to “ clear the
horizon for a more authentic word, for a new
reign of Truth.” 28
This move is significant, and it is perhaps what
allows us to characterize these three thinkers as
modern, rather than postmodern, critics. Although
they attack false consciousness, they cling to
the possibility of a “ truer”
consciousness.
Nietzsche wants to recapture the meaning of the
will to power by meditating on the deceptions of
“ superman,”
“ eternal
return,”
and
“ Dionysus.” 29 Marx argues for a “ conscious
insight” that will counteract the mystification
And,
as
Ricoeur
of
false
consciousness.30
explains, “ What Freud desires is that the one who
is analyzed, by making his own the meaning that
was foreign to him, enlarge his field of
consciousness, live better, and finally be a
little
freer
and,
if
possible,
a
little
happier.” 31
Thus, the hermeneutics of suspicion as practiced
by
these
three
modernist
thinkers
involves
demystifying
illusion
and
fable,
but
then
replacing that false consciousness with something
“ better” and “ truer.” Postmodern thinkers take
this hermeneutics of suspicion one step farther
by questioning whether the “ true” consciousness
that emerges through demystification is any truer
than the “ false”
consciousness that existed
previously. On this view, Nietzsche, Marx, and
Freud, no matter how suspicious they were, can
still
be
characterized
as
part
of
the
Enlightenment project. This project, as David
Harvey has written, “ took it as axiomatic that
there was only one possible answer to any
question. From this it followed that the world
could be controlled and rationally ordered if we
could only picture and represent it rightly.” 32
Likewise, Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud offered
particular forms of order that they advocated as
28. Id. at 33.
29. See id. at 35.
30. See id. at 34-35.
31. Id. at 35.
32. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS
OF CULTURAL CHANGE 27 (1990).
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the more accurate picture of the world.
By contrast, in his seminal work, The Postmodern
Condition,
Jean-François
Lyotard
defines
postmodern existence as the inability to believe
in any such “ metanarratives.” 33 And, in his
explication of metanarratives, Lyotard includes
as an example Marx’s political story of class
conflict and revolution.34 He could easily have
included the metanarratives asserted by Nietzsche
and Freud as well. Indeed, Jean Baudrillard makes
the point starkly when he writes that, whereas
modernity is concerned with “ the immense process
of the destruction of appearances . . . in the
service of meaning,” post-modernism addresses the
“ immense process of the destruction of meaning,
equal
to
the
earlier
destruction
of
appearances.” 35
This is a kind of “ hyper-suspicion.” From this
perspective,
all
explanatory
stories
are
contingent, even those offered by the skeptical
critic. It is this constant questioning that
leads some people to view such postmodern
suspiciousness as nihilistic or paranoid.36 For
these critics of postmodernism, it is one thing
to undertake a process of dismantling that also
provides for rebuilding. It is quite another to
take a stance “ where the point is precisely to
dismantle with no ground left, but only a
multiplicity of standpoints which amounts to no
standpoint— an everywhere which is nowhere.” 37 On
this view, “ The enabling suspicion of the older
tradition
is
extended
and
intensified
into
paranoia— and thus becomes disabling.” 38
I do not share this view, although I am
33. See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE, at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 1984) (1979).
34. See id.
35. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 160-161 (Sheila F. Glaser
trans., Univ. Mich. Press 1994).
36. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Professor of
Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 37.
37. Linda Fisher, Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Postmodern
Paranoia: Psychologies of Interpretation, 16 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE
106, 112 (1992).
38. Id.; accord RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 129 (2000) (“ [I]n the end the skeptical
postmodern is left with nothing more than endless play and detached
irony” ); JAMES B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE 51 (1992) (“ What
characterizes the condition of culture since World War II is . . .
that now we have more signs than referents, more images than
meanings that can be attached to them.
The machinery of
communication often communicates little except itself— signs just
refer to each other, creating a ‘simulacra’ of reality.” )
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sympathetic to its concerns. It is undoubtedly
the case that some postmodern scholars, both in
law and the humanities, have focused so much on
dismantling
that
they
are
left
with
no
constructive story to tell. However, I do not
think that nihilism is a necessary feature of
postmodern thought.39 Indeed, I will argue in Part
Five that, by recognizing the existence of
multiple stories, all with potentially legitimate
claims to truth, we can focus on the play of
opposing
discourses
and
the
creative
possibilities that arise from conversation among
competing narratives. The view from postmodernism
need not be so bleak.40 Nevertheless, it is clear
that the basic approach of both modern and
postmodern critics in the twentieth century has
been characterized by a general suspicion about
truth claims.
II. THE HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION AND
SOCIOLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A.An Overview of Trends
In legal scholarship, we might view some of the
key
theoretical
movements
in
the
twentieth
century
as
a
similar
progression
of
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion.
First,
scholars
attacked
the
purportedly
neutral
principles
underlying legal doctrine in order to spark
progressive reform. Next, they turned to the
question of whether law reform could achieve the
aims of justice. And finally, they began to
envision law as a pervasive and inescapable form

39.
My hopefulness about the possibilities that exist within
postmodern legal discourse perhaps distinguishes this Essay from
earlier attacks on critical legal theory. For example, in his wellknown essay, The Death of the Law?, Owen Fiss criticized the
“ negativism” of critical legal studies and argued for the building
of social and political movements reminiscent of the 1960s that
would help foster “ a belief in public values.” Owen Fiss, The Death
of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1986). In many respects, my
aims are similar to Fiss’s. He too sought “ [a]n appreciation of law
as a generative force of our public life,”
id. at 15, and
identified the skeptical stories of critical legal theory as
potentially destructive of that aim. Unlike Fiss, however, I do not
pin my hopes on a revival of the political activism of the 1960s
(though I would certainly be pleased to see the return of such an
activist spirit). Nor do I decry critical theory as inherently
destructive. Rather, I suggest that the very antifoundational
insights of postmodern theory that Fiss criticizes might be used to
open an imaginative space for understanding law in ways that might
generate the public values Fiss seeks.
40. See SHERWIN, supra note 38, at 128-33 (distinguishing between
“ skeptical” and “ affirmative” postmodernism).
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of social control. As a way of summarizing these
moves, I will consider a collection of essays
published
in
1998,
Justice
and
Power
in
Sociolegal Studies. Because the editors and many
of the contributors to the collection are leading
figures
in
contemporary
law
and
society
scholarship,
the
volume
provides
a
useful
snapshot of current perspectives in the field as
well as a “ native” account of scholarly trends
over the past several decades authored by two
active participants, Bryant G. Garth and Austin
Sarat.
In the first decades of the twentieth century,
legal realists asserted that legal doctrine was
inherently indeterminate, and therefore decisions
about contested doctrinal issues were always
decided based on non-doctrinal factors. Law and
society research in the 1960s extended this
critique, pushing a progressive agenda that
sought to use law instrumentally to achieve
distributional justice. As described by Garth and
Sarat in the Introduction to Justice and Power in
Sociolegal Studies, “ At this stage in the
development of law and society research, there
was a taken-for-granted understanding of the
nature of justice and an unembarrassed commitment
to the project of using social research to
promote justice through law.” 41 Thus, scholars
focused on the gap between “ law on the books”
and “ law in action” in order to suggest better
ways of implementing a just legal order. For
example, Garth and Sarat cite an American Bar
Foundation Survey of Criminal Justice in the
1950s and 1960s finding that the exercise of
discretion among regulators and the police was
one factor preventing the criminal justice system
from operating consistently with the progressive
ideals being articulated by the Supreme Court in
that era.42 The focus, in this and other “ gap
studies,” was to identify and explain deviations
from the regulatory ideal. However, “ [i]mplicit
in most of this research was the assumption that
the state regulatory policies, like the goals of
the criminal justice system, represented an
appropriate starting point for a researcher
strongly committed to social justice.” 43
The legal realist critique and sociolegal gap
studies can be viewed as equivalent to the
41. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 4.
42. See id. at 4-5.
43. Id. at 5.
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modernist
version
of
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion
described
by
Ricoeur.
Just
as
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud (in Ricoeur’s view)
attacked
false
consciousness
but
remained
committed
to
the
existence
of
a
“ truer”
consciousness,
so
too
did
legal
realists
challenge the truth claims of legal formalism,
while
remaining
committed
to
using
law
instrumentally to achieve justice.44 Similarly,
early law and society scholarship employed the
hermeneutics of suspicion to expose the failure
of specific legal efforts to enact meaningful
reform, but did not question the fundamental
assumption
that
the
legal
order
was
an
appropriate site for seeking justice.
The next move in the progression toward greater
suspicion came from those (to use Garth and
Sarat’s taxonomy) who criticized gap studies and
“ raised questions about the ability of the
liberal state, even in the best of times and with
the best intentions, to realize social justice.” 45
Here, law was still seen in instrumental terms,
but as a force that actually thwarts meaningful
reform. Thus, Garth and Sarat cite the work of
scholars who, they say, viewed “ the entire
regulatory effort [as] some kind of hoax,
unlikely ever to contribute to the progressive
goals
implicit
in
early
enthusiasm
for
regulation.” 46
These
scholars
expressed
“ skepticism about the power of litigation to
promote social change, about claims of right
generally, about the helpfulness of due process
hearings for welfare recipients, the usefulness
of
consumer
rights,
the
proliferation
of
alternative dispute mechanisms, and the autonomy
of the legal profession.” 47
44. See Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal
Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505, 521 (1987): (“ Realism undertook its
rule-debunking program in the service of exposing the law for what
it really was: social policymaking. But the Realists did not intend
to leave the Emperor naked. The law’s ‘ought’ could be . . .
discovered by a fact-sensitive adjudication overtly and consciously
informed by the methods of social science.” )
45. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); see also JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (1978); JOHN HEINZ & EDWARD LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: BUREAUCRACY,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1987); STUART
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
(1974); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in
1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 267 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Marc
Galanter, Why the “ Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Stewart
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Here we see the hermeneutics of suspicion
deployed in order to expose not only the failure
of law reform but also the very impossibility of
law reform. This perspective questions the power
of even well-intentioned people to bring us
closer to justice through law. As Garth and Sarat
describe, “ Loss of confidence in researchinspired progressive legal reform led law and
society scholars away from the strategy of
‘delivering legality’ as a way of delivering
justice.” 48 It is in this period that we also see
the
emergence
of
critical
legal
studies
scholarship challenging the classic doctrines of
American law and legal education, including
contracts, torts, and corporations, as well as
antidiscrimination and labor law. Some analyses
argued that appeals to reason or principle are
inevitably incoherent and that the resolution of
legal
questions
is
therefore
inherently
political.49 Others focused on the suppression of
alternative values by dominant ideologies.50 Still
others argued that legal education was an
indoctrination of individuals into a dominant
Finally,
some
critical
scholars
elite.51
challenged assumptions underlying communication
itself by claiming that all meaning is ultimately
determined by the listener/reader.52
These moves exemplify a further elaboration of
the suspicious approach. There is again a
distrust of stated rationales and a desire to
expose false consciousness. But now, under the
influence of postmodern critical theory, we begin
to find a new level of unmasking— not merely that
one particular justice claim is ineffective, but
Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
115 (1979).
48. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 6-7 (citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys
ed., 1982).
50. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1984); Mary Jo Frug, Rereading
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 1065 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
51. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 8; Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note
49.
52. In 1988 Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux observed that, in
light of “ ambiguities of interpretation, many legal theorists have
substituted for the hermeneutics of objective interpretation what
Gerald Graff has termed a “ hermeneutics of power,”
where one
emphasizes the political and social determinants of reading texts
one way as opposed to another.” INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, at xiii
(Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (quoting Gerald
Graff, Textual Leftism, 49 PARTISAN REV. 566 (1982)).
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that any justice claim is inevitably compromised
by the legal language and institutional context
in which it is framed. In the ongoing discourse
between law and power, power was beginning to
triumph as the fundamental “ truth”
to be
revealed
through
critical
(i.e.
suspicious)
scholarship.
Finally, Garth and Sarat identify the move
toward
a
constitutive,
rather
than
an
instrumental, vision of law. Such an approach
focuses not on how law might serve progressive
goals, but instead on how law works within a
society to help shape social relations. “ The
study of ideology and legal consciousness, in
particular, became part of the quest for an
understanding of this side of law’s power.” 53
A constitutive view of law sees legal discourse,
categories, and procedures as a framework through
which individuals in society come to apprehend
reality. Thus, law is not merely a coercive force
operating externally to affect behavior and
social relations; it is also a lens through which
we view the world and actually conduct social
relations. On this view, “ [L]aw shapes society
from the inside out by providing the principal
categories in terms of which social life is made
to seem largely natural, normal, cohesive, and
coherent.” 54 Clifford Geertz perhaps provided a
manifesto for the constitutive view in 1983:
[L]aw, rather than a mere technical add-on
to a morally (or immorally) finished society,
is, along of course with a whole range of
other cultural realities . . . an active part
of
it. . . .
Law . . .
is,
in
a
word,
constructive; in another constitutive; in a
third, formational.55
Law, with its power to place particular
things that happen . . . in a general frame in
such a way that rules for the principled
management of them seem to arise naturally
from the essentials of their character, is
rather more than a reflection of received
wisdom or a technology of dispute settlement.56

53. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 8 (citation omitted).
54. Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools,
12 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 129, 134 (2000) (reviewing KAHN, supra note 9),
.
55. Geertz, supra note 6, at 218.
56. Id. at 230.
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For at least the past fifteen years, sociolegal
scholars have largely pursued a constitutive
vision of law and therefore have treated law as
(1) a belief system that helps to define the
roles of individuals within society; (2) a system
of organization that determines societal roles;
and (3) a language for conceptualizing reality,
mediating
social
relations,
and
defining
behavior. Following Geertz, they have deployed
various interpretive methods to study the “ webs
of signification” 57 found within law.
Significantly, taking a constitutive view of law
need not commit one to the hermeneutics of
suspicion. Indeed, in the final Part of this
Essay, I will attempt to point toward a less
skeptical constitutive approach. Nevertheless, as
Garth and Sarat point out, many of those who have
adopted a constitutive view of law’s power have
focused on law as a particularly pervasive form
of social control. “ Studying the power of law as
social control has led scholars to consider the
mechanisms through which liberal legality works
to limit our conceptions of justice as well as
our efforts to promote social change.” 58 Indeed,
the deployment of the hermeneutics of suspicion
has become so complete that it is difficult for
its
adherents
to
remain
committed
to
any
instrumental social reform task. As Garth and
Sarat observe, “ research on law’s constitutive
power
generally
shows
how
law
disciplines
potential challengers to the social order rather
than serving to promote change and reform.” 59 From
such a perspective, even the idea of justice is
unmasked and demystified. “ Justice becomes at
best
an
external,
political
critique— and
otherwise an inevitable disciplinary ally of
law’s hegemony.” 60 As Susan Silbey has written,
“ [T]he
ideals
and
principles
that
legal
institutions announce, even though they fail to
support them, are part of how legal institutions
create their own power and authority.” 61
Thus, the progression of sociolegal scholarship
charted by Garth and Sarat can be seen as stages
in the further elaboration of a hermeneutics of
suspicion. As they acknowledge, “ Recognition of
57. Id. at 182 (quoting A.M. HOCART, KINGS AND COUNCILLORS: AN ESSAY IN
COMPARATIVE ANATOMY OF HUMAN SOCIETY 128 (1970)).
58. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 8.
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. Silbey, supra note 14, at 274.

THE
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law’s hegemony and its constitutive power [has]
undermined the optimism of the vision of ‘social
justice through law’ that animated so much early
scholarship.” 62 And, now that many sociolegal
scholars take as given the idea that law is
constitutive, it is not surprising to see a
substantial body of scholarship predicated on the
idea that law is fundamentally a language and
structure of social control and a means by which
entrenched power relations are constructed and
legitimized. Even the more recent turn in
sociolegal scholarship to a focus on “ agency” —
the ways in which individuals contest and resist
legal
categories— tends
to
build
from
the
assumption that law inevitably operates as a
force
of
power,
thereby
engendering
the
resistance.63 Moreover, although I have focused on
the development of law and society scholarship in
particular, the basic scholarly approach will no
doubt be familiar to those who identify with
movements in feminist legal theory, critical race
theory, and others. Employing the hermeneutics of
suspicion, these scholars too have attempted to
uncover
the
ideological
biases
in
legal
categories, the stories excluded or distorted
through law, and the inequities inherent in legal
discourse, procedure, and adjudication.64 As Garth
and Sarat observe, “ many scholars would say that
they now study power, not justice.” 65
B.Specific Scholarly Projects
So far, the discussion has been fairly abstract.
In this Section, therefore, I will explore how
the hermeneutics of suspicion plays out in
several articles. My aim is neither to criticize
62. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 10.
63. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 54, at 140 (“ Contests over
meaning in courts or commun-ities . . . become occasions for
[sociolegal scholars to observe] the play of power. Meanings that
seem natural, or taken-for-granted, are described as hegemonic, but
because the construction of meaning through law is, in fact,
typically contested, scholars show the many ways in which resistance
occurs.” ) (citation omitted). For examples of such work, see SALLY
ENGEL MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKINGCLASS AMERICANS (1990); BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE
SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993). For a further
discussion of the agency critique, see infra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
64. Surprisingly, even interdisciplinary scholars in public choice
theory and law and economics, who are not generally associated with
a progressive agenda, employ a “ watered-down”
hermeneutics of
suspicion by positing that self-interest (rather than stated values)
is the “ true” explanation of political and social processes. See
also supra note 20.
65. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 10.
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these projects nor show the ways in which they
are
wanting.
Indeed,
I
have
deliberately
attempted to select strong examples of suspicious
scholarship in order to avoid the accusation that
I am setting up a straw man. Thus, I attempt to
identify some of the consequences of a suspicious
approach
even
in
works
that
make
useful
contributions.
Turning again to Justice and Power in Sociolegal
I
begin
by
looking
at
Carol
J.
Studies,
Greenhouse’s essay in that volume, Figuring the
Future: Issues of Time, Power, and Agency in
Ethnographic
Problems
of
Scale.66
Greenhouse
focuses on two concepts, diversity and community,
and seeks to describe law’s role with regard to
both. She offers two case studies. First, she
discusses press coverage of the 1992 violence in
Los Angeles after the verdict in the trial of
four police officers accused of beating Rodney
King. Then, she analyzes the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,67 as well
as the text of three major federal civil rights
statutes enacted from 1964 to 1991.68
Starting from these two case studies, there are
a number of different stories Greenhouse might
have told about the role of law with regard to
diversity and community. For example, she might
have discussed the way in which the civil rights
laws attempted to construct a more inclusive
conception of community by providing more space
for diversity in society. Or she could have
discussed the circumstances under which civil
rights lawsuits might provide a community forum
for discussion among diverse voices. Or she might
have talked about the ways in which law could
speak usefully about diversity or help to
construct community.
But Greenhouse instead chooses to tell a story
that equates the various civil rights statutes
with the police crackdowns in Los Angeles. She
acknowledges that the two case studies seem to be
opposites: one “ involves massive disruption and
violence,” and the other “ involves the legal
poetics of equality.” 69 But, she argues that the
66. Carol J. Greenhouse, Figuring the Future: Issues of Time,
Power, and Agency in Ethnographic Problems of Scale, in JUSTICE AND
POWER, supra note 7, at 108.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1991,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
69. Greenhouse, supra note 66, at 114.
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differences between the two case studies
are superficial. In fact, they both associate
diversity axiomatically with violence, and
both associate diversity with a corollary need
for
active
legal
intervention.
The
interventions differ in form— police action in
Los Angeles and judicial and legislative
action in the civil rights context— but not in
their operative premise that diversity is
intrinsically uncivil without the intervention
of the law.70
It
is
important
to
recognize
how
the
hermeneutics of suspicion works here. We might at
first think that civil rights statutes are an
attempt to acknowledge diversity and protect it
by preventing discrimination. But Greenhouse
attempts to demystify the statutes. She reads
them to be as hostile to the idea of diversity as
was the newspaper coverage of the Los Angeles
riots that focused on the supposedly inherent
volatility of multi-ethnic neighborhoods. And she
argues that law is not so much about mediating
the effects of diversity in order to foster
community, as about claiming the power to
transform diversity into civility.
Greenhouse views the civil rights statutes as an
assertion
of
state
power,
an
attempt
to
“ construct ‘community’ around the central axis of
the state’s role in the management of diversity
in physical space.” 71 Thus, a disorderly community
“ call[s] forth the law’s coercive powers of
But
an
orderly
physical
social
control.” 72
community that resorts to courts rather than
violence is also squelching diversity by invoking
the state as mediator among diverse groups that
are “ implied as being ordinarily inimical to each
other.” 73
Greenhouse also focuses on the constitutional
basis for the federal civil rights statutes.
Historically, the ability of Congress to enact
such statutes has been justified as an exercise
of its power to regulate interstate commerce.
Although
most
observers
would
agree
that
justifying
civil
rights
legislation
as
a
regulation of commerce is counterintuitive, there
are historical and jurisprudential reasons that
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
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such an approach proved to be a pragmatic
strategy to persuade the Supreme Court of the
constitutionality of the statutes.74 Greenhouse
chooses to tell a different story, however. From
this
jurisprudential
choice
she
makes
the
observation that, in the civil rights law,
“ commerce emerges as an ongoing materialization
of the state’s agency that . . . takes up its
vigil
over
the
public
space
through
law
enforcement.” 75
In
Greenhouse’s
account,
the
interstate commerce rationale is itself somewhat
suspicious. She argues that the civil rights
statutes “ imply . . . that the colonization of
the future will be financed with capital borrowed
from the meanings of difference.” 76
Thus, Greenhouse’s story subverts the idea that
the civil rights statutes represent any kind of
advance toward justice or societal tolerance for
diversity. Instead, she argues that in both the
fears about urban violence and the enactment of
civil rights legislation, “ the state’s centrality
in the public management of ‘diversity,’ the
materialization of that agency in investment and
commerce, and the commoditization of identity
emerge as inextricably linked ideas and social
processes.” 77 Moreover, she rejects the idea that
the concept of “ community” might even provide a
meaningful aspirational goal. Rather, she views
“ community” as merely a rhetorical conceit that
is “ deliberately reworked as legal and political
strategies by architects and adversaries of
74. Indeed, as many critics have observed, the clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing the “ privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” would seem to be a more likely
source for Congress’ power to enact civil right legislation. The
Supreme
Court
construed
this
language
so
narrowly
in
the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1872), however, that
proponents of such legislation were forced to look elsewhere to
justify congressional power. For further discussion of more recent
calls to overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases, see, e.g., CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED, AND UNNAMED 146-48
(1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 2830 (1980); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 199-232 (1993); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-2 to 7-4 (1978); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1149
(1991); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 103-04 (1993); Philip J.
Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: Its Hour Come Round at
Last?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972); William Winslow Crosskey,
Charles Fairman, “ Legislative History,”
and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3-10 (1954).
See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216-20 (1986).
75. Greenhouse, supra note 66, at 124.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127.
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change.” 78
These are provocative ideas, and I do not here
wish to take issue with any of Greenhouse’s
contentions. Instead, I note only the choice of
stories. What are the narratives that we take
from the essay? Federal civil rights statutes are
ultimately hostile to diversity because they
implicitly associate diversity with violence.
These statutes inevitably inscribe the state’s
role in managing and enforcing the transformation
of diversity into civility. Such state control is
linked
to
commerce,
commoditization,
and
colonization. And “ community”
is a strategic
construct used to enforce these norms of civility
and
control.
Thus,
Greenhouse
effectively
challenges our faith in the aspirational goals of
civil rights as diversity-protecting, communitybuilding, or civility-enhancing.
My second example of the way in which sociolegal
scholarship chooses among multiple available
stories comes from the study of procedural
justice. Tom R. Tyler’s essay, Justice and Power
in
Civil
Dispute
Processing,79
provides
an
overview of the substantial literature in this
area.
The
literature
consists
largely
of
empirical studies about litigant satisfaction
with
various
dispute
resolution
mechanisms.
“ Instead of evaluating litigation experiences
against objective criteria specifying desirable
features of procedures or outcomes, experiences
are
evaluated
in
terms
of
the
subjective
experiences of the litigants.” 80
Such studies use interviews with disputants to
examine the degree to which people care simply
about “ winning,” and the extent to which they
care
about
other
elements
of
the
dispute
resolution process, including notions of fair
procedure. For example, one study of civil
litigation81 reached two basic conclusions. First,
just looking at outcome turns out to be a poor
predictor of litigant satisfaction. “ Whether
assessed in terms of length of time to case
resolution (delay), costs to the litigant, and/or
78. Id.
79. Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power in Civil Dispute Processing,
in JUSTICE AND POWER, supra note 7, at 309.
80. Id. at 313.
81. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’
VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
(1989); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort
Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990).
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amount won or lost, objective indicators do not
explain
much
about
people’s
postlitigation
feelings.” 82 Second, litigant satisfaction is
closely correlated with subjective perceptions of
whether the process was just. Moreover, the
factors that influenced such a determination,
rather than being related to outcome, focused
more on process issues such as whether the
participant had the opportunity to address the
decision
maker,
whether
the
decision
maker
appeared
to
be
honest,
and
whether
the
participant
was
treated
with
dignity
and
respect.83
From this research two alternative stories (at
least) can be told, both of which are consistent
with a constitutive theory of law’s power. The
first story starts from the evidence that, even
for its participants, law is not solely (or
perhaps even primarily) an instrumental means for
achieving a desired outcome. Rather, the legal
process can be a substantive end in itself. Law
provides a forum for storytelling, a set of rules
for constructive discourse, and a site for
subjective observations about fairness. As a
result, so this story goes, it is essential for
achieving substantive justice that the legal
system seem just and provide an effective locus
for discourse. Indeed, on this view, such factors
would need to be a basic part of any analysis as
to what justice is.
The second, more skeptical, story challenges the
first one in two significant ways. As an initial
challenge, this story questions why we should
think
that
the
subjective
experiences
of
litigants provide any truly useful information
about conceptions of justice. This is because
people’s beliefs may reflect false consciousness.
As Susan Silbey has argued, unequal power in
society
allows
certain
groups
to
establish
hegemony in a society’s ideology. By hegemony,
she
means
“ those
circumstances
where
representations and social constructions are so
embedded as to be almost invisible, so taken for
granted that they ‘go without saying, because,
being axiomatic, they come without saying.’” 84 If,
as Silbey contends, liberal law is hegemonic,
82. Tyler, supra note 79, at 315.
83. See id.
84. Silbey, supra note 14, at 287 (quoting 1 JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN
COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION: CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND
CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 23 (1991)).

273517

2001]

06/24/01 1:37 PM

Berman

127

then people’s evaluations of their experiences
may simply be a reproduction of a society’s
ideology rather than an “ objective” statement of
their actual interests.
A further challenge transforms the idea of
procedural fairness into a view about the
legitimation of power. On this view, procedural
justice is not so much a worthwhile aspiration as
it is a means for law to appear fair while in
reality
perpetuating
power
dynamics
in
the
society. Indeed, Garth and Sarat question the
procedural justice literature for precisely this
reason: “ The justice that is described in
research
on
procedural
justice
is
fully
compatible with, and may be an essential part of,
the processes through which law legitimates
itself
and
unjust
social
arrangements.
Thus, . . . studies of procedural justice may
tell us less about justice as an ideal and more
about the power of law to get its way.” 85
Again, I do not argue that there is anything
more “ correct” about the first story than the
second, with its dual skeptical challenges. But
notice the difference in tone and emphasis. The
first story discusses the potential ways in which
the justice system might actually provide a
helpful forum, and might generate a sense of
fairness,
justice,
and
satisfaction
through
procedural or ritual mechanisms. The second story
argues that, even if people gain a sense of
satisfaction, their perceptions are irrelevant
because the participants are in the thrall of
false consciousness and are therefore reproducing
hegemonic
ideologies
about
which
they
are
unaware. Moreover, this story argues that the
quest
for
procedural
justice
is
inevitably
compromised because creating the appearance of
justice is merely a way of legitimating law’s
power.
In recent years, sociolegal scholars such as
Patricia Ewick, Susan Silbey, Austin Sarat,
Barbara Yngvesson, Sally Engel Merry, and David
Engel have offered somewhat more optimistic
variations on the idea of law as hegemony
discussed above. Although they still present
legal narratives as hegemonic, they insist that
law is always locally contested. Accordingly,
they refuse to accept a depiction of law’s
subjects as mere passive victims of law’s power.

85. Garth & Sarat, supra note 7, at 11.
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Rather, these authors see active “ agents” who
may sometimes manipulate the legal system to win
partial,
but
consequential
victories,
both
material and symbolic.86
Yet even in these accounts, law tends to be
viewed not as an enabling language that actually
provides the opportunity for engagement among
conflicting narratives, but as a form of power
“ emanating
outward
from
the
sources
of
sociocultural production to shape the practices
of everyday life,” 87 and therefore allowing a
space for alternative worldviews only through an
act
of
resistance.
Moreover,
although
disempowered people may contest the categories
imposed on them by law, such contests are seen as
temporary, their effects short-lived. In these
analyses, law is no longer a rigid hegemony—
dictating categories and determining meaning in
an absolute way— but it is still viewed as a
“ moving hegemony.” This moving hegemony “ allows
for the coexistence of discipline and struggle,
of
subjection
and
subversion,
and
directs
attention toward a dynamic analysis of what it
means to be caught up in power.” 88 Yet, the
tactical
resistance
of
disempowered
groups
ultimately does not “ dislodge the power of law or
the dominance of legal rules and practices.” 89
Indeed, “ Even when relatively powerless persons
adopt a counterhegemonic view of the world . . .
they construct it around the cultural shapes and
forms that law helps to create.” 90 Thus, although
these scholars offer a picture of law that allows
for the possibility of multiple narratives, those
narratives are seen as oppositional, not as
inherent
and
empowering
features
of
legal
discourse itself. Accordingly, these accounts
still tend to be framed in a suspicious language
focused on exposing the inevitable and largely
unnoticed dominance of legal categories.
Two final examples of the hermeneutics of
suspicion should suffice. First, I point to the

86. See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21; MERRY, supra note 63;
YNGVESSON, supra note 63; Austin Sarat, “ . . .The Law is All Over” :
Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor,
2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990). For a discussion of this turn in
sociolegal scholarship, see David M. Engel, How Does Law Matter in
the Constitution of Legal Consciousness?, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? 109
(Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
87. Engel, supra note 86, at 131.
88. YNGVESSON, supra note 63, at 121.
89. Sarat, supra note 86, at 376.
90. Engel, supra note 86, at 134.

273517

2001]

06/24/01 1:37 PM

Berman

129

work of Pierre Schlag, even though he is not
represented
in
the
Justice
and
Power
in
Sociolegal Studies collection, because he has
continued to offer a forceful critique of legal
discourse from the perspective of critical legal
studies. Schlag, in numerous articles and in his
book The Enchantment of Reason,91 argues that
judges and legal academics are trapped in a
jointly
constructed
maze
of
incoherent
justifications for the legal system. He contends
that judges refuse to acknowledge “ all that law
is and all that law does” and instead insist on
“ a romanticized and inflated shadow image” of
the law that legitimizes the inherently violent
nature of legal practice.92 Moreover, he argues
that legal academics tend to perpetuate this
mythology because most academics were formerly
judicial clerks and so are invested in the
judicial enterprise. As a consequence “ of the
legal academic’s primal identification with the
persona of the judge,” 93 Schlag concludes, legal
scholarship devolves into “ the legitimization and
rationalization of judicial opinions.” 94 Thus,
Schlag argues that legal scholarship is devoted
to obscuring the “ real” workings of the legal
system.
This
perspective
exemplifies
the
extreme
skepticism
of
much
critical
sociolegal
scholarship. Other scholars, working in a more
realist
mode,
have
similarly
sought
to
demonstrate that legal doctrine is inevitably a
product
of
political
partisanship
by
using
empirical data to show that judges decide cases
based
on
non-doctrinal
factors.
One
recent
example is Richard Revesz’s work regarding the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.95
Revesz
argues
that
ideology
“ significantly influences”
judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit; that ideological
voting is more prevalent in cases where purely
procedural challenges are raised; and that a
judge’s vote is greatly affected by the party
affiliation of the other judges sitting on the

91. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
92. Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2053, 2054
(1993).
93. Id. at 2067.
94. Id. at 2063.
95. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
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panel.96
Both Schlag and Revesz tell stories that aim to
strip away the veneer covering legal doctrine,
though Schlag obviously takes this critique much
farther than Revesz. They view judicial decisions
(and legal doctrine more generally) as a form of
subterfuge, disguising law’s power and the play
of ideology. The story that remains untold in
these accounts, of course, is the story of
principled decision-making, the idea that judges
strive,
however
imperfectly,
to
articulate
principles in their adjudication of cases and aim
to be faithful to the decisions and articulated
principles of the past. This may again be a story
that allows law to seem principled and therefore
disguise its hegemonic power, but it is also a
story that might inspire us to think of law as
more than just an exercise in power politics, and
thereby to look past our own parochial interest,
acknowledge an opposing view, and try to develop
a
language
for
mutual
accommodation
and
understanding. A language of principle might
therefore be useful, regardless of whether or not
such principles are truly determinative.
To the extent that practice of the hermeneutics
of suspicion in twentieth-century scholarship has
successfully eroded notions of legal method as a
science and legal rules as formalist truths,
there can be little doubt that such scholarship
has opened up a more varied and subtle set of
inquiries and understandings about law. Moreover,
much of this scholarship has been vitally
important both in exposing many legal principles
and procedures to be the product of hierarchy,
ideology,
and
language,
and
in
bringing
previously unheard voices to debates about legal
doctrine. Finally, the constitutive theory of
law, which views law as a lens for constructing
reality, holds much promise as an interpretive
framework because it allows us to see the ways in
which law influences both our comprehension of
and
discourse
about
social
and
political
conflicts.
Yet,
as
some
of
the
previous
discussion
indicates, there are also potential drawbacks to
these kinds of skeptical stories, and we should
be self-conscious about the ramifications of our
96. In the study, judges were assigned the party affiliation of
the president who appointed them (which is, of course, in and of
itself a debatable rubric for determining the ideology of any
particular judge).
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choice to tell them. The next Part revisits the
articles just discussed in an attempt to identify
some of these potential drawbacks.
III. THE HERMENEUTICS OF SUSPICION AND ITS LIMITATIONS
I see at least two reasons to be concerned about
the use of the hermeneutics of suspicion as the
primary method for legal/cultural scholarship.
First, the focus on unmasking a cultural practice
may tend to situate the observer outside of the
practice being studied, thereby robbing the
observer of empathy and perhaps distorting the
ultimate account. Second, oversuspiciousness may
actually discourage efforts toward political
change
and
may
have
a
disempowering
or
dispiriting effect on society as a whole.
A. The Importance of Empathy
The hermeneutics of suspicion tends to place the
scholarly observer in a position superior to
those who are the objects of study. The skeptical
critic tends to point out what is “ really going
on” in a particular social practice, and what is
“ really going on” is almost never acknowledged
or understood by those who work within that
practice. Indeed, because the participants are
understood to be deluded by false consciousness,
their perceptions and understandings of the world
are easily discredited, or at least discounted.97
The Revesz piece provides an example. Harry T.
Edwards, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, wrote
an article responding to Revesz’s charge that the
D.C. Circuit judges resolve disputes based on
Aside
from
many
political
partisanship.98
disagreements over Revesz’s statistical analysis
(which are not relevant here), Edwards argues
that Revesz’s work, and those by others in a
similar vein, is fundamentally flawed because it
treats as irrelevant the subjective experience of
the judges themselves. To Edwards, “ serious
scholars seeking to analyze the work of the
courts
cannot
simply
ignore
the
internal
experiences
of
judges
as
irrelevant
or
disingenuously
expressed.
The
qualitative
impressions of those engaged in judging must be
97. Note that this concern may exist regardless of whether the
critic ultimately takes a position for or against the practice being
studied. See supra note 20.
98. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
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thoughtfully
considered
as
part
of
the
equation.” 99
Revesz’s response to this charge might well be
that he must discount the stated motivations of
the judges. Indeed, if his attempt is to uncover
the judges’ “ real” motivations rather than their
“ conscious” motivations, then the protestations
of the judges are worse than irrelevant— they may
actually be evidence of the judges’ false
consciousness!
We have already discussed this same approach
with regard to the empirical studies of dispute
processing.
A
skeptical
critic
might
well
discount a litigant’s reported satisfaction with
the
legal
system
on
the
ground
that
the
individual has succumbed to the illusion spun by
law’s embedded power. Greenhouse’s reaction would
likely be similar. For example, we could imagine
that all those who drafted the civil rights
statutes considered in her article reported that,
in drafting the statutes, they were attempting to
encourage diversity. We could imagine further
that all the litigants who have successfully
pursued claims under these statutes over the
years
reported
that
filing
the
suits
had
encouraged
tolerance
of
diversity
in
their
communities. Even with this testimony, it is
unlikely that Greenhouse’s analysis would change.
And, of course, anyone attempting to refute
Schlag with discussions about the importance of
legal rules or principles would, in Schlag’s
terms, be exhibiting the very pathology that
Schlag is attempting to expose.
Thus, not only is the critic situated in a
position of superior perception, any objection by
the participants can easily be dismissed as a
product of the delusion itself. One can see how
this logic operates among Ricoeur’s “ masters of
suspicion” as well. The rhetoric of suspicion
creates a dichotomy: those ensnared by false
consciousness, and those who can get out from
under it and see the snare. Whether this snare is
deluded
Christian
mythologies
(Nietzsche),
capitalist
false
consciousness
(Marx),
or
repression (Freud), the basic strategy is the
same.100
99. Id. at 1338.
100. See FREDERICK CREWS, SKEPTICAL ENGAGEMENTS, at xiii (1986) (“ Just
as Marxism divides humankind into those people illumined by
proletarian consciousness and those entrapped in capitalist false
consciousness, so Freudianism can acknowledge only deep knowers—
roughly, the analyzed— and the repressed.” ). See generally JOHN
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At first blush, it appears that postmodern
critics should be able to answer this objection.
Unlike the modernists, they purport not to be
saying what is “ really” going on beneath the
surface
because
they
believe
that
the
interpretations are no more real than the surface
behavior.101 However, the basic move is the same
because the critic is able to recognize that
truth is a contingent notion, while the people
being discussed do not. Moreover, the view that
truth is contingent tends to mean that contests
about truth claims are inherently questions of
politics, ideology, and power. Thus, like the
skeptical
critiques
discussed
above,
most
postmodern critical approaches tend to view human
behavior through this lens, even while denying
that any one lens is authoritative.
One might well ask, of course: Why should we be
concerned that a scholarly approach tends to
place the critic and reader in a position of
greater perception than those working within a
societal practice? After all, most of us probably
have had the experience of seeing a situation
more clearly with the benefit of hindsight or
from a more emotionally detached perspective. Why
shouldn’t critics have the same privilege? My
answer is that of course they should. Indeed, as
I will stress later in this Essay, a less
suspicious
hermeneutics
does
not
mean
that
critics lose their ability to be critical. Thus,
there certainly may be times when a critic is
able to recognize the significance of an issue
that was unnoticed by the participants.
But a less suspicious, more empathetic reading
has the virtue of acknowledging that the lived
experience of the participants is at least
relevant
to
the
discussion.
To
take
the
Revesz/Edwards
debate
as
an
example,
an
empathetic hermeneutics would most certainly find
it significant that judges believe themselves to
be acting based on precedent and principle rather
than political partisanship. Indeed, only by
taking the judges’ belief seriously will we
become aware of the possibility that the belief
itself might function as a constraint on judicial
FARRELL, FREUD’S PARANOID QUEST: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MODERN SUSPICION (1996).
101. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, or Can We
Know What We’re Doing?, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC,
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 436, 436-67 (1989)
(arguing that the theorist, because he or she inhabits a particular
way of thinking and speaking, cannot ever get “ outside” of a social
practice in order to achieve an “ objective” view).
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discretion. Thus, judges who believe in legal
principle and repeatedly tell themselves and the
world a story about both the non-ideological
nature
of
their
work
and
the
substantial
constraints on their discretion may, in fact, be
more
constrained
in
their
decision-making,
regardless of whether or not a critic can
“ prove” that such constraints are illusory.102
As a result, less suspicious scholarship may
have two benefits in this regard. First, it
encourages critics both to be empathetic toward
their subjects and to resist the urge to take a
God’s-eye view.103 Second, it forces the critic to
include in the analysis the lived reality of the
people being studied, leading to a richer, more
textured view.
B. Paranoia and the Corrosive Effects of
Suspicion
The second drawback of the hermeneutics of
suspicion is perhaps even more important. As some
scholars
have
noted,
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion can easily slip from healthy skepticism
into a kind of rhetorical paranoia. Paranoia, of
course, is a loaded term, and probably a bit
unfair.
Nevertheless,
because
it
is
used
frequently in the academic literature about the
hermeneutics of suspicion, I will use it as
well— though I want to make clear that I believe
paranoia to be the hypothetical extreme in the
movement toward skeptical scholarship. I do not
mean
to
imply
that
any
actual
scholars
necessarily display such paranoid logic.
Critics
of
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion
describe the “ paranoid style of functioning” 104
as “ an intense, sharply perceptive but narrowly
focused mode of attention” that results in an
attitude
of
“ elaborate
suspiciousness.” 105
Paranoid
individuals
constantly
strive
to
demystify appearances; they take nothing at face
value because “ they regard reality as an obscure
dimension hidden from casual observation or

102. See, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Law, Belief, and Building: The
Education of Harry Edwards, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (2000) (discussing
the role that belief in neutral principles and the rule of law plays
in the actual practice of judging).
103. See supra note 17.
104. Francis J. Mootz, The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal
Scholarship, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 873, 879 (1994).
105. William Bywater, The Paranoia of Postmodernism, 14 PHIL. &
LITERATURE 79, 80 (1990).
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participation.” 106 On this vision,
The obvious is regarded as misleading and as
something to be seen through. So, the paranoid
style sees the world as constructed of a web
of hints to hidden meaning. . . . The way in
which the paranoid protects fragile autonomy
is by insuring, or at least insisting, that
the paranoid’s interpretation of events is the
interpretation.107
Such a paranoid style may, over time, have a
potentially
corrosive
effect
on
society.108
Consider the long-term consequences of repeated
exposure to suspicious stories. An appeal to
religious ideals is portrayed as an exercise of
political power or the result of deluded magical
thinking. A canonical work of art is revealed to
be the product of a patriarchal “ gaze.”
The
programs of politicians are exposed as crass
maneuverings for higher office or greater power109;
the idealistic rhetoric of judicial opinions is
depicted as an after-the-fact justification for
the exercise of state-sanctioned violence; the
life choices of individuals are shown to be
responses to psychological neurosis, or social
pathology.
All of these are exaggerations, but they
increasingly represent the rhetoric that is used
to
describe
human
interaction
both
in
contemporary society and in the past. As Richard
Rorty describes,
In this vision, the two-hundred-year history
of the United States— indeed, the history of
the European and American peoples since the
Enlightenment— has been pervaded by hypocrisy
and self-deception. Readers of Foucault often
come away believing that no shackles have been
broken in the past two hundred years: the
harsh old chains have merely been replaced
with slightly more comfortable ones. Heidegger
describes America’s success in blanketing the
106. Mootz, supra note 104, at 879.
107. Bywater, supra note 105, at 80-81.
108. See Jean Bethke Ehlshtain, Will the Real Civil Society
Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 585 (2000)
(criticizing an “ all-knowing skepticism [that] is skeptical about
everything but skepticism” ).
109. See, e.g., JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 161-65 (1996) (criticizing the news media for
repeatedly covering stories as if the content of political dialogue
is irrelevant and only the immediate political advantage or
disadvantage is worth discussing).
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world with modern technology as the spread of
a wasteland. Those who find Foucault and
Heidegger convincing often view the United
States of America as . . . something we must
hope will be replaced, as soon as possible, by
something utterly different.110
If that is one’s viewpoint, it will inevitably
be difficult to muster one’s energy to believe in
the possibility of positive action in the world,
short of revolution (and even revolution is
probably inevitably compromised). As Rorty points
out,
though
the
writers
of
supposedly
“ subversive” works “ honestly believe that they
are serving human liberty,” it may ultimately be
“ almost impossible to clamber back down from
[these works] to a level of abstraction on which
one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty,
a candidate, or a political strategy.” 111
Of course, one might view this as a positive
development. One might think people should stop
being lulled into a false sense of believing that
the rhetoric of public life really matters. If
people
began
to
view
such
rhetoric
as
a
construction of entrenched power, so the argument
might go, they would form the nucleus of a truly
revolutionary political movement.
I doubt that such an eventuality is likely to
occur. Moreover, I am not sure that a culture of
suspiciousness is the most effective way to seek
political (or personal) change anyway. Suspicious
analysis seeks to expose the dangers of our
enchantment with reason or truth or collectivity,
but there are dangers that arise from relentless
disenchantment as well. As Richard K. Sherwin has
observed,
[W]ithout the means of experiencing more
profound
enchantments,
without
communal
rituals and social dramas through which the
culture’s deepest beliefs and values may be
brought to life and collectively reenacted,
those beliefs ultimately lose their meaning
and die. . . . Forms of enchantment in the
service of deceit, illicit desire, and selfgratification alone must be separated out from
forms of enchantment in the service of
feelings, beliefs, and values that we aspire
to affirm in light of the self, social, and
legal realities they help to construct and
110. RORTY, supra note 18, at 7.
111. Id. at 93.
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maintain.112
If all we have is relentless suspicion, we are
unlikely to be inspired to create a better world.
Instead, we are likely to feel a kind of
collective guilt and self-loathing (or worse a
fatalistic apathy) because of the hopelessly
compromised system we have created or to which we
have acquiesced. Such guilt, self-loathing, and
apathy is, as Rorty argues, a luxury that agents
who need to act in the world cannot afford to
maintain.113
Paul Kahn, in his recent book, The Cultural
Study of Law, indirectly suggests a possible
response
to
this
critique.
Kahn
encourages
sociolegal scholars not to worry so much about
being political or social agents of the sort
Rorty describes. Instead, he argues that scholars
studying law as a cultural system should move
“ away from normative inquiries into particular
reforms and toward thick description of the world
of meaning that is the rule of law.” 114 If we
resist being seduced into focusing on the policy
ramifications of our work, Kahn believes, we
could better study law the way a religious
studies scholar studies religion: not from the
perspective of one who is a part of the practice
under
consideration,
but
as
an
independent
observer seeking to understand the cultural
meaning of the practice from a greater distance.
Thus, Kahn argues that it is a mistake for
scholars to be too invested in legal practice,
regardless of whether they see themselves as
law’s custodians or law’s reformers. Rather, Kahn
contends that we would be better off suspending
our belief in law’s rule altogether,115 thereby
allowing us to analyze legal practice without a
normative agenda.
Although I agree with Kahn that sociolegal
scholarship need not include explicitly normative
policy
ramifications
to
be
effective,
his
approach still requires the scholar to choose a
hermeneutic stance. Even if we adopt the more
distanced “ observer” perspective Kahn advocates,
we still must choose to analyze legal and
cultural practices through a suspicious lens or
through one that is more sympathetic. And this
112.
113.
114.
115.

SHERWIN, supra note 38, at 228-31.
See RORTY, supra note 18, at 33.
KAHN, supra note 9, at 91.
See id. at 3.
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choice
inevitably
has
social
and
political
consequences
of
the
sort
described
above.
Moreover, I am concerned about Kahn’s particular
articulation of the legal scholar’s task: to
suspend belief in law’s rule. Such a formulation
seems to invite a more skeptical stance than I
find appropriate. Nonetheless, there is nothing
about his call to study law as a cultural system
rather than as a set of policy prescriptions that
requires us to study law from the perspective of
disbelief. Indeed, as I argue below, studying any
cultural practice (whether literature or religion
or law) from a perspective of belief— as long as
it is not completely uncritical belief— may
ultimately be more fruitful. Regardless of one’s
position on that issue, however, it seems to me
that, at the very least, the move toward less
normative scholarship cannot extricate scholars
from
the
fundamental
questions
that
I
am
discussing.
IV. A HERMENEUTICS OF MEANING, FAITH, AND
SYMPATHETIC INTERPRETATION
Ricoeur contrasts the hermeneutics of suspicion
with a hermeneutics of meaning. This hermeneutics
is based on a conception of faith. In Ricoeur’s
words, “ The contrary of suspicion, I will say
bluntly, is faith. What faith? No longer, to be
sure, the first faith of the simple soul, but
rather the second faith of one who has engaged in
hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism,
postcritical faith.” 116 Such faith is difficult if
one employs the hermeneutics of suspicion because
such a skeptical approach tends to promote
“ knowingness” rather than belief. Once one has
exposed or demystified a cultural practice, it
will inevitably be more difficult to believe in
that practice whole-heartedly. One might accept
it as the best of a bunch of poor alternatives,
but it will lose its power to inspire.
As Rorty argues, “ Knowingness is a state of
soul which prevents shudders of awe. It makes one
immune to romantic enthusiasm.” 117 For example, he
points out that it is difficult to be inspired by
a cultural practice while at the same time
viewing that practice “ as the product of a

116. RICOEUR, supra note 12, at 28.
117. RICHARD RORTY, The Inspirational Value
ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 18, at 125, 126.
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mechanism of cultural production.” 118 To view a
work in this way, he contends, may yield
understanding, but not self-transformation.
The hermeneutics of suspicion tends to require
that the cultural practices under observation be
placed within the framework of the critic. But if
a practice, such as the work of the United States
Supreme Court, is to have inspirational value, it
must be allowed to recontextualize much of what
the observer previously thought she knew; it
cannot,
at
least
at
first,
be
itself
recontextualized by what the observer already
believes.119 Thus, if we begin with the suspicious
premise that justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
are articulating hopelessly indeterminate legal
principles
that
merely
mask
the
inevitable
assertion
of
power
inscribed
within
legal
discourse, then we will have precluded the
possibility that we could be surprised or
inspired by the beauty, poetry, or idealism of
the Court’s project.120
But
how
might
we
fashion
an
alternative
approach? In order to pursue one possibility, I
wish to draw upon Ronald Dworkin’s work on
interpretation. Dworkin was writing primarily
about how judges decide cases, but his approach
is generalizable into a theory of interpretation
that may be a useful model. Thus, for my purposes
it is less important whether Dworkin accurately
describes the process of judging than whether he
offers a helpful metaphor through which we might
consider the idea of sympathetic interpretation
more generally.
Dworkin’s metaphor is the chain novel. He asks
us to presume a group of novelists get together
and decide collectively to write a novel. One
writer will contribute the first chapter, pass it
on to the second writer, who will contribute the
next chapter, and so on. In this scenario, “ every
writer
but
the
first
has
the
dual
responsibilities of interpreting and creating
118. Id. at 133.
119. See id.
120. As Rorty argues, the Foucauldian refusal to indulge in
utopian thinking may not be the product of sagacity, but rather a
result of Foucault’s “ unfortunate inability to believe in the
possibility of human happiness, and his consequent inability to
think of beauty as the promise of happiness.” Id. at 139.
I recognize, of course, that for many the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in the recent presidential election, see Bush v. Gore, 121
S. Ct. 525 (2000), severely undermines any possibility of being
inspired by the Court’s work. I address this issue in a postscript
to this Essay, infra.
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because each must read all that has gone before
in order to establish, in the interpretivist
sense, what the novel so far created is.” 121
How then might, say, the writer of the sixth
chapter go about interpreting the preceding five
chapters?
Notice
that
the
hermeneutics
of
suspicion may not work very well here. Even
though the author of the chapter must decide what
the book is “ really” about, what the motivations
of the characters “ really” are, and so on, it is
unlikely that unmasking the descriptions provided
in earlier chapters as the product of false
consciousness will make a very successful novel.
Similarly, if the novel through five chapters is
an Agatha Christie-like mystery, the writer will
be likely to refrain from turning the sixth
chapter into a philosophical exegesis on the
nature of human relationships. Such an approach
might well make the book seem disjointed and
poorly written. Notice that this is true even if
the writer of the sixth chapter honestly prefers
philosophical works to Agatha Christie novels. In
the act of interpretation, the writer of the
sixth chapter must attempt to make the overall
work into the best possible work of art it can
be, not transform it into a different one. As
Dworkin points out, “ Interpretation of a text
attempts to show it as the best work of art it
can be, and the pronoun insists on the difference
between explaining a work of art and changing it
into a different one.” 122
Of course, my sixth chapter may differ from
yours, because we have different ideas of what
makes a work of art good. But the point is that
both of us must attempt to make the work as it
exists into the best work it can be. As with the
Agatha Christie example above, we are not free
simply to ignore the first five chapters merely
because we have a very different idea of how
those chapters should have been written. “ An
interpretation cannot make a work of art more
distinguished if it makes a large part of the
text
irrelevant,
or
much
of
the
incident
accidental, or a great part of the trope or style
unintegrated and answering only to independent
standards of fine writing.” 123
121. RONALD DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 146, 158 (1985). Dworkin uses this metaphor again in his
later work, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 19.
122. DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 150.
123. Id.
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In likening this process to the act of commonlaw judging, Dworkin articulates an attractive
theory of sympathetic interpretation:
Each judge must regard himself, in deciding
the new case before him, as a partner in a
complex
chain
enterprise
of
which
these
innumerable
decisions,
structures,
conventions, and practices are the history; it
is his job to continue that history into the
future through what he does on the day. He
must interpret what has gone before because he
has a responsibility to advance the enterprise
in hand rather than strike out in some new
direction of his own. So he must determine,
according to his own judgment, what the
earlier decisions come to, what the point or
theme of the practice so far, taken as a
whole, really is.124
Again, I am not interested here in whether this
is an accurate description of how judges decide
cases, nor am I interested in taking sides in the
long-running scholarly debates about Dworkin’s
approach to interpretation.125 Instead, I want to
consider
Dworkin’s
conception
solely
as
a
thought-experiment that might suggest a useful
attitude for scholars to adopt. Notice how this
attitude differs in tone and emphasis from the
hermeneutics of suspicion. For example, in Part
Three of this Essay, I argued that one drawback
of the suspicious approach is that it may appear
to
place
the
commentator
apart
from
the
pathologies or delusions of the people operating
within a given social practice. Thus, in the act
of pointing out others’ “ false consciousness,”
one
implicitly
exempts
oneself
from
that
consciousness.
In
contrast,
Dworkin’s
model
requires the interpreter to treat herself as a
“ partner” in the endeavor being analyzed.
Moreover,
because
the
interpreter
is
in
partnership with the activity or text being
analyzed, she will be more likely to think of it
as a joint enterprise and therefore construct the
best explanatory framework she can. Accordingly,
she will try to understand what this enterprise
amounts to and develop an interpretation that
124. Id. at 159.
125. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang:
Interpretation in Law and Literature, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY,
supra note 101, at 87; Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and
Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk About Objectivity Any More,
in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983).
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both fits the contours of the enterprise and
offers the best justification for it.126 This again
is very different from the hermeneutics of
suspicion. A suspicious reading generally seeks
to undermine the practice being studied. If one
is attempting to expose, unmask, or demystify in
order to show the “ real” unvarnished truth, one
is, by definition, not attempting to create the
best justification for it or make it into the
best practice it can be. To the contrary, the
hermeneutics of suspicion usually seeks to show
the
essentially
compromised
nature
of
the
practice.
Again, I want to step back from the argument for
a moment, because I do not want it to be misread.
I am not condemning skepticism as a critical
stance altogether. Nor do I advocate merely
accepting all human practices at face value
without employing any critical judgment at all.
It is important to recognize that, in describing
the hermeneutics of meaning, Ricoeur defined it
as postcritical faith, not uncritical faith.
More importantly, my aim is not to advocate that
either critical stance be eradicated. Indeed, a
key question that I must leave to another day is:
How does one decide in any given situation which
scholarly stance to take? The answer to this
question is not at all clear to me, and I hope to
pursue the issue in a future essay. For now, I
must be content merely to open up space so that
such a question can be asked. Thus, I suggest
only that we examine the stories that we as
scholars tend to tell and then think about
whether there are others that we might tell but
do not, simply because we reflexively fall into
using one critical stance instead of another.
Let me use an example that is closer to home. My
experience
has
been
that,
at
academic
conferences, reading groups or colloquia, or in
humanities
or
law
classes,
much
of
the
conversation centers on all the issues the book
or article under discussion failed to address.
Thus, we hear that the author left out a
consideration of X, which would have complicated
her analysis, or that she failed to recognize the
ways in which issues of power were embedded in Y,
so she missed a key part of what was “ really”
going on, etc. Almost inevitably, the piece that
was “ left out” happens to be the focus of the

126. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 228-38.
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critic’s own scholarly agenda. These are not
sympathetic readings. Because human experience is
widely varied and multi-faceted, there will
always be aspects of an issue that are omitted in
any given scholarly account. But instead of
focusing on what the author failed to do, we
might look at what her particular project was and
see
if
we
can
form
the
best
possible
understanding of that project. I remember when I
was in an undergraduate anthropology course, we
would read book after book from the history of
anthropological theory, and for each book, all we
would discuss was what that account had missed.
By the end of the semester, I was left feeling
that there were no examples of worthwhile
anthropology scholarship. This is precisely what
can
happen
if
the
stories
we
tell
are
unrelentingly
suspicious.
We
deprive
our
listeners of a sense of inspiration, of models to
follow, of belief in possibilities.
V. A LESS SKEPTICAL APPROACH TO THINKING ABOUT
LEGAL DISCOURSE
Having proceeded this far, I feel compelled to
provide an example of a less skeptical approach
to understanding legal practice in the United
States. My aim here is not to lay out a complete
theory, nor even to convince you that it is
correct. Rather, I offer a sketch in order to
suggest one possible way in which a more
sympathetic story about law in American culture
might be told.
One possible sympathetic story, of course, is
simply to accept the status quo and argue that it
should be preserved. This approach, however,
might
fail
Ricoeur’s
requirement
that
a
hermeneutics of meaning be “ postcritical.” In
any event, I want to try something different from
that. Moreover, I want to accept and adopt many
of the antifoundational insights of postmodern
theory, and then construct a story about legal
discourse and practice in America that is
aspirational.
Recently, Richard K. Sherwin’s When Law Goes
Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law and Popular
Culture127 has attempted a similar project. Sherwin
argues (as I have earlier in this Essay) against
what
he
calls
“ skeptical
postmodernism.”
Referring to Baudrillard, Sherwin observes that
127. SHERWIN, supra note 38.
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skeptical
postmodernism
“ manifests
a
marked
inclination
toward
pessimism
and
disenchantment.” 128 If truth, meaning, and reality
are no longer discernible, and if any sense of
the unified self or human agency is illusory, he
argues,
we
risk
living
in
a
world
where
“ individuals can no longer be held accountable
for having ‘authored’ their acts or caused an
event to happen.” 129 According to Sherwin, “ In
the end the skeptical postmodern is left with
nothing more than endless play and detached
irony.” 130
Nevertheless, like me, Sherwin refuses to
jettison postmodern theory altogether. Instead,
he
contends,
“ Postmodernism
need
not
be
skeptical. . . . A story might concede the demise
of the autonomous modern subject, but still find
meaning through the distributed self: an identity
made
up
of
multiple
cultural
and
social
constructs
shared
by
others
in
particular
communities.” 131
Similarly,
taking
Sherwin’s
“ affirmative
postmodern”
view,
we
might
recognize that concepts such as truth and justice
are contingent, but still see those ideas as
coherent.
“ Abstraction
may
give
way
to
particularity,
contextuality,
multiplicity;
judgment may turn toward characteristic voices
and localized accounts. But localization and
contextualization are not fatal to meaning. It
remains possible to seek rather than abandon
meaning for concepts like truth and justice— even
in the face of contingency, unpredictability, and
spontaneity.” 132
Following Sherwin’s suggestion, I wish to pursue
a story about law that makes no attempt to return
to a formalist world where legal rules are
“ truths” to be “ discovered” by judges. Rather,
I accept the idea that there is an infinite
number of possible narratives for describing
reality and that each narrative is inevitably a
product of many cultural forces. Further, I will
accept that, at least within a certain range,
none of these narratives necessarily has a
stronger claim to truth than any other. In such a
world, how might one understand and justify law

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
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practice in America?133
My suggestion is that we might conceive of law
as a site for encounter, contestation, and play
among various narratives. I draw on Hannah
Arendt’s conception of the “ public” as a space
of appearance where actors stand before others
and are subject to mutual scrutiny and judgment
from a plurality of perspectives.134 The public, on
this view, “ consists of multiple histories and
perspectives
relatively
unfamiliar
to
one
another, connected yet distant and irreducible to
one another.” 135 By communicating about their
differing perspectives on the social world in
which they dwell together, people and communities
can
collectively
constitute
an
enlarged
understanding of the world.136 In this Part,
therefore, I will first outline a prominent
conception of “ communicative democracy”
that
builds on Arendt, offered by political theorist
Iris M. Young. Then, I will speculate about law’s
potential as a site for the type of idealized
public discourse Young envisions.137
In recent decades, political philosophers and
legal theorists,138 drawing on the ideas of
133. Sherwin sees the challenge similarly. He asks:
[I]s
it
possible
reflectively
to
reframe
the
myth
of
modernity . . . to avoid the excesses of skeptical postmodern
irrationalism and disenchantment on the one hand, and of
modernist rationality and repression on the
other?
Put
differently: how are we to affirm a world of meaning in which
law and democracy may flourish?
SHERWIN, supra note 36, at 233.
134. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 50-58 (1958).
135. IRIS M. YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 111 (2000) (discussing
Arendt).
136. See ARENDT, supra note 134, at 50-58; see also LISA J. DISCH,
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 80 (1994); Anna Yeatman, Justice
and the Sovereign Self, in JUSTICE AND IDENTITY: ANTIPODEAN PRACTICES 195
(Margaret Wilson & Anna Yeatman eds., 1995). For an interpretation
of the Arendtian public in terms of plurality, see SUSAN BICKFORD, THE
DISSONANCE OF DEMOCRACY: LISTENING, CONFLICT, AND CITIZENSHIP (1996).
137. My ultimate project, which seeks to apply theories of
deliberation and discourse to legal practice, will also build upon
Thomas Morawetz’s application of Wittgenstein to the process of
legal discourse. See Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, supra
note 16.
138. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS,
POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1990); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); THOMAS A. SPRAGENS,
REASON AND DEMOCRACY (1990); James Bohman, Public Reason and Cultural
Pluralism, 23 POLITICAL THEORY 253 (1995); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation
and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); Jane J.
Mansbridge, A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation, in THE
POLITICS OF INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS TRANSFORMED (Mark P. Patracca ed.,
1992); Frank Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
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thinkers such as Arendt139 and Jürgen Habermas,140
have developed a conception of deliberative
democracy as an alternative to what might be
called an “ interest-based” model of democracy.
Using an interest-based model, democracy is seen
primarily as a way of expressing one’s interests
and registering them in a vote. The goal of
democratic decision-making, on this view, “ is to
decide what leaders, rules, and policies will
best serve the greatest number of people, where
each person defines his or her own interests.” 141
As a result, democratic decisions will be the
outcome of competition for self-interested votes.
Deliberative theorists, in contrast, conceive of
democracy as a process that actually helps to
create a public sphere. They argue:
Democratic processes [must be] oriented around
discussing
[a]
common
good
rather
than
competing for the promotion of the private
good of each. Instead of reasoning from the
point
of
view
of
the
private
utility
maximizer,
through
public
deliberation
citizens transform their preferences according
to public-minded ends, and reason together
about the nature of those ends and the best
means to realize them.142
Building on this view, deliberative theorists
attempt to define those societal settings most
conducive to such public deliberation.
The vision of deliberative democracy does not
necessarily mean that all debates must reach
consensus or that differences of economic power,
education,
and
cultural
background
must
be
bracketed in the search for some mythical common
good.143 Indeed, as Young has argued, to the extent
that
deliberative
theorists
may
have
L.J. 1539 (1988).
139. See generally ARENDT, supra note 134.
140. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger
& Frederick Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962); 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY
(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1984); Jürgen Habermas,
Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
141. Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond
Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 140, at
120, 120.
142. Id. at 121.
143. See generally JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM,
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996) (criticizing communitarian and neorepublican interpretations of deliberation as requiring too much
consensus).
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overemphasized such requirements, we might adjust
this model so that it is less about deliberation
toward consensus, and more about communication
across differences. Indeed, Young points out, one
of the problems of focusing on consensus is that
such a conception cannot account well for the
transformation
the
communicative
process
should often produce in the opinions of the
participants. If we are all looking for what
we
have
in
common— whether
as
a
prior
condition or as a result— then we are not
transforming our point of view.144
Accordingly, she calls her alternative conception
a
model
of
communicative,
rather
than
deliberative, democracy.
Young’s conception of communicative democracy
may
be
particularly
useful
in
helping
to
articulate a generative vision of law. She views
the goal of democratic discourse to be the
process of encountering differences of meaning,
social
position,
language,
background,
and
perspective. Inclusion of multiple points of view
is obviously important because it is a means of
demonstrating equal respect for those views. But,
Young argues, the inclusion of multiple voices
serves two other important functions as well:
“ First, it motivates participants in political
debate to transform their claims from mere
expressions of self-regarding interest to appeals
to justice. Second, it maximizes the social
knowledge available to a democratic public, such
that citizens are more likely to make just and
wise decisions.” 145 Both functions are deserving
of further consideration.
As to the first, Young argues that, when a
debate includes multiple voices, we must each
pursue discourse that is not framed in the
rhetoric of pure self-interest. “ Because others
are not likely to accept ‘I want this’ or ‘This
policy is in my interest’ as reasons to accept a
proposal,
the
requirement
that
discussion
participants
try
to
make
their
claims
understandable and persuasive to others means
they must frame the proposals in terms of
justice.” 146 This does not mean, of course, that
others will necessarily agree with the justice
claim, but nevertheless, at least on a rhetorical
144. Young, supra note 141, at 127.
145. YOUNG, supra note 135, at 115.
146. Id.
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level, the claim must be framed from a broader
point of view. Because such a view must take into
account
a
range
of
socially
differentiated
perspectives, we are forced to recognize that our
own perspective is merely one among many.
“ Listening to those differently situated than
myself and my close associates teaches me how my
situation looks to them, in what relation they
think I stand to them.” 147 This acknowledgment of
multiple stories is particularly important for
those with more power in society:
Those in structurally superior positions not
only take their experience, preferences, and
opinions
to
be
general,
uncontroversial,
ordinary, and even an expression of suffering
or disadvantage . . . but also have the power
to represent these as general norms. Having to
answer to others who speak from different,
less privileged, perspectives on their social
relations
exposes
their
partiality
and
relative blindness.148
Thus, the requirement that people speak in a
language that acknowledges multiplicity may help
moderate some of the normalizing tendencies of
dominant discourse.
As to the second function, Young argues that
including multiple points of view not only has
the potential to alter the rhetoric of public
discourse, but also provides an opportunity to
gain knowledge about a broader cross-section of
society.
People
in
differentiated
social
positions may have (1) different understandings
of their social position in relation to others;
(2) a particular point of view about the
perspectives
of
others;
(3)
a
unique
understanding of their society’s history; (4) a
distinctive conception of “ how the relations and
processes of the whole society operate” ; and (5)
a position-specific narrative about the natural
and physical environment.149 As a result, if people
are going to address collective problems, they
must
acknowledge
and
embrace
each
other’s
perspective and thereby recognize their own
perspective as only partial. “ Such an enlarged

147. Id. at 116.
148. Id.; see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (discussing the importance of multiple
perspectives as a means of dislodging stated assumptions about
social relations).
149. See YOUNG, supra note 135, at 117.
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view better enables them to arrive at wise and
just solutions to collective problems to the
extent that they are committed to doing so.” 150
Having briefly sketched a scenario for ideal
communicative democracy, the question now is
whether we can tell a story about legal practice
that envisions legal discourse and procedure as a
potential site for such communication. I believe
such a generative story is available.
To begin, there can be little doubt that law, at
least as practiced in this country, holds a
privileged place as a forum for addressing social
and political issues. Indeed, de Tocqueville’s
famous observation that “ scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question” 151 has been repeated so often that it
has itself become a part of our national lore.
Moreover, the pervasive presence of law in
American society grew still greater in the
twentieth century, penetrating more spheres of
social and domestic life.152 The century saw the
enfranchisement of women and the enforcement of
civil rights protections for African Americans.
In addition, we witnessed the establishment of
public defender offices to represent criminal
defendants, the expansion of the Bill of Rights
to cover a range of police procedures and prison
conditions, and the creation of an income tax
law, bank deposit insurance laws, social security
laws, and regulatory laws aimed at everything
from environmental protection to the filing of
corporate
financial
statements.
Government
agencies dispatched agents around the country to
enforce legal rights and duties. Litigation among
business corporations grew rapidly,153 and the size
of law firms serving corporate clients increased
as well.154 By the end of the twentieth century,
the threat of legal liability permeated the
operation of universities, public school systems,
150. Id. at 118.
151. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Henry Reeve trans., Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
152. The examples in this paragraph are drawn from a useful
discussion of law in twentieth-century America found in Robert
Kagan, Bryant Garth & Austin Sarat, Facilitating and Domesticating
Change: Democracy, Capitalism, and Law’s Double Role in the
Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY (Robert Kagan et al.
eds., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 7-8, on file with author).
153. See, e.g., William Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite
Bar in New York City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413 (1990).
154. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE BIG LAW FIRMS (1991).
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hospitals, and municipal governments, as well as
tobacco companies, land developers, and product
manufacturers.
Perhaps
most
significantly,
ordinary individuals increasingly came to think
of themselves as possessing legal rights and
therefore defined “ the law” not only as a range
of official demands and constraints, but as a
universally available set of entitlements.155
Thus, we can see that, throughout the twentieth
century, de Tocqueville’s observation remained
accurate. From the Scopes monkey trial to the
trial of O.J. Simpson, from the national debate
over abortion to the more recent clashes over
doctor-assisted suicide, from the success of
novelist John Grisham to the explosion of law
shows on television, our national obsession with
law appears to have continueds unabated. And,
even
though
lawyers
are
often
objects
of
derision, when the chips are down, we Americans
are apt to frame our struggles in the language of
competing rights and fight our battles in a legal
forum.156
This forum could be envisioned to be a model for
multivocal discourse of the sort Young advocates.
Indeed, law is a social practice that both
recognizes
the
existence
of
many
different
narratives and provides the opportunity to create
new
narratives
that
may
help
forge
group
identities.157
Legal
proceedings,
therefore,
function in part as a site for adjudicating among
various explanatory narratives for describing
reality.158
Both trials and judicial opinions, for example,
ultimately construct a narrative about a disputed
event by rendering a decision or verdict. They do
so,
however,
only
after
first
enacting
a
performance in which the society “ creates, tests,
changes, and judges”
the various competing
155. See generally EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21.
156. Whatever one might think about the role of the courts in the
presidential election of 2000, there can be little doubt that the
post-election
contest
is
a
testament
to
the
extraordinary
willingness of Americans to wage political battles in a legal forum.
For a discussion of how the ideas in this Essay relate to the
election and its aftermath, see Postscript, infra.
157. See Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth
Amendment: Reasoning About “ the Woman Question” in the Discourse of
Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW, 131, 133-34 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
158. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 15; see also Paul
Schiff Berman, An Observation and a Strange But True “ Tale” : What
Might the Historical Trials of Animals Tell Us About the
Transformative Potential of Law in American Culture?, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
123 (2000).
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discourses
that
could
make
up
our
social
knowledge.159 As James Boyd White has observed,
The judicial process not only recognizes the
individual
but
compels
him
to
recognize
others. For the litigant, the lawyer, and the
observer alike, the central ethical and social
meaning of the practice of the adversary
hearing is its perpetual lesson that there is
always another side to the story, that yours
is not the only point of view.160
On this view, law’s strength is precisely in its
ability to provide a forum for testing the
persuasive power of competing narratives:
The multiplicity of readings that the law
permits is not its weakness, but its strength,
for it is this that makes room for different
voices, and gives a purchase by which culture
may be modified in response to the demands of
circumstance. It is a method at once for the
recognition of others, for the acknowledgment
of ignorance, and for cultural change.161
In its ideal state, therefore, law provides a set
of institutions that emphasize the fact that “ we
are a discoursing community, committed to talking
with
each
other
about
our
differences
of
perception, feeling, and value, our differences
of language and experience.” 162
Consider, for example, the paradigmatic exchange
between teacher and student in a first-year law
school classroom. The student has an initial
reaction to a case or an issue. Immediately, that
student
is
forced
to
confront
multiple
alternative narratives for understanding the
question. For example, the student might be asked
to consider a less sympathetic set of facts, or
to argue the issue from the opposing party’s
point of view. Or the student might be forced to
address the question from the perspective of law
and economics, or critical legal studies. The
teacher might point out the historical reasons
the
law
evolved
in
a
contrary
fashion.
Ultimately, the debate might include questions of
159. Robert Hariman, Performing the Laws: Popular Trials and
Social Knowledge, in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LAW 17,
29 (Robert Hariman ed., 1990).
160. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM 266 (1990).
161. James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 444 (1982).
162. WHITE, supra note 160, at 80.
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public
policy,
judicial
competence,
the
appropriate division of responsibility among
branches
of
government,
and
the
practical
impediments to reaching a solution. In the end,
the student is encouraged to develop a more
nuanced viewpoint, one that takes greater account
of all the various available narratives on the
issue. At its best, this process should be a
lesson in tolerance for opposing viewpoints, an
exercise in humility. The student can develop a
greater understanding and appreciation for other
ways
of
conceptualizing
issues.
From
this
idealized exchange, we can envision law as a
“ method of individual and collective selfeducation, a way in which we teach ourselves,
over and over again, how little we can foresee,
how much we depend on others, and how important
to us are the practices we have inherited from
the past.” 163
Thus, we can perhaps tell a story of law as a
useful
site
for
discourse
among
multiple
worldviews. And when we think of law in this way,
we need not be limited to the idea that law is
only the official discourse that takes place in
courtrooms and legal memoranda. Rather, as the
constitutive view makes clear, law talk is
dispersed
throughout
the
culture— in
the
newspaper accounts of legal decisions, in the
everyday conversations that invoke conceptions of
legal rights, and in the way law is portrayed in
movies,
on
television,
and
in
books.164
Accordingly, law is not simply a form of
pervasive hegemonic control dictated and managed
by elites. We are all continuously producers and
consumers of our legal culture, and the story is
always in flux. Moreover, all of these multiple
understandings and perspectives can be seen as an
inevitable part of the language of justice, not
simply
as
a
set
of
stories
generated
in
opposition to law’s power.165 As one commentator
has
pointed
out,
“ justice . . .
involves
reconciling diversities into a restored and new
multiple unity. Justice requires a unity of
differences; mutuality and incorporation rather
than
annihilation
of
opposites
and

163. Id. at 266.
164. See supra note 21.
165. This distinction may be why the view of law I suggest is
different from the focus of some sociolegal studies of “ agency” —
the ways in which individuals resist law. See supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text.
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distinctions.” 166
Such a unity is always provisional, always
contingent,
always
contested.
As
Sherwin
observes,
It is precisely the proximity of disorder—
deriving from constant contestation among
conflicting discourse communities as well as
from
the
various
irrational
forces
that
surround and suffuse them— that compels new
forms of legal self-organization. . . . This
is how law adapts to the contingencies and
vicissitudes of shifting social, cultural, and
technological (among other) developments.167
In the end, law’s generative potential in
American culture rests on its availability as a
site
for
continuous
self-criticism
and
recreation. And the effort to articulate principles
of justice, the creation of fora for debating
those principles, the commitment to a culture of
conversation about them, and the recognition that
clashes among various forms of knowledge are
inevitable and desirable— these are the aspects
of law we might want to celebrate, tell stories
about, and strive to achieve.
These
stories
about
law
strike
me
as
particularly important ones for those of us
within the legal academy to communicate to our
students. Law professors and students have long
wrestled with the issue of why so many students
enter law school with a strong sense of idealism
about law and a clear set of intuitive personal
values, only to lose their grip on both during
the first year of law school. This process is
often derisively referred to as “ learning to
think like a lawyer,”
and is treated as
synonymous with being forced to abandon one’s own
sense of moral truth. It strikes me that the
disillusionment many feel during the first year
of law school arises because students are forced
to acknowledge that, on any given issue, there
are multiple competing views, many of which are
valid even if one does not agree with them. Thus,
students are having their preconceptions or
prejudices
challenged.
Such
challenges
are
useful, but professors are often content merely
to challenge; we do not take the next step, which
is to show students that there is an independent
166. Jane Flax, The Play of Justice, in DISPUTED SUBJECTS: ESSAYS ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 111, 123-24 (1993).
167. SHERWIN, supra note 38, at 238-39.
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ethical value in trying always to see and respect
multiple points of view. Thus, the oft-criticized
willingness of lawyers to espouse any point of
view regardless of personal belief does not
necessarily signal a cynical lack of conviction.
Rather, it is an acknowledgment that all points
of view deserve to be aired. It is a recognition
that human truths are contingent, that it is
always possible to use many different narratives
to describe any single event. Indeed, one might
even say that the very language and structure of
our legal processes are premised on the idea of a
discourse among multiple worldviews. Learning to
think like a lawyer is, ideally, a lesson in
tolerant, creative, civic discourse.
This is, of course, merely a sketch of a more
systematic analysis of law in American culture
that must await future elaboration. However, even
this brief account may offer a sense of what a
less
skeptical
approach
to
legal/cultural
analysis might look like. I also realize that my
vision of law as a potentially generative
cultural practice is an idealistic one and that
there are many objections that could be made. For
example, it could be argued that official legal
discourse, far from embracing multiple points of
view, is severely limited by formal rules,168 and
actually distorts alternative stories or shuts
them out altogether by privileging only certain
types of rhetoric, which must be spoken by an
elite, trained, professional class.169 Moreover,
even the legal norms that tend to conflate
discussion with argument may tend to mute certain
These
objections
are
types
of
voices.170
168. For example, critical race theorists, feminists, and others
have advocated relaxing the rules of evidence to encourage narrative
testimony. See, e.g., Jacqueline St. Joan, Law and Literature: Sex,
Sense, and Sensibility: Trespassing Into the Culture of Domestic
Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 266 (1997) (arguing that “ rules of
evidence and the interrogatory format of the trial process suppress
the female voice,” and suggesting that a remedy to the problem lies
in “ broadening the scope of judicial inquiry at trial and loosening
the restrictions on narrative-style testimony” ); Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1988); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality
and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Martha Minow, When
Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded,
Equal Protection, and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987). Many other sources are collected in Barbara
J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a
Constitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273 (1994).
169. See, e.g., Lucy E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 1 (1990).
170. See, e.g., Marianne Constable, Reflections on Law as a
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significant, and any generative story about law
requires that we not accept legal discourse
uncritically.
Nevertheless, the idealized story still plays an
important role. In a less skeptical approach to
conceptualizing legal discourse and practice it
is essential for us to look at law, not as it
exists in any particular place and time, but “ as
a collective activity of mind and spirit, which
has the possibility of goodness, of value, even
of greatness.” 171 The aim is similar to that
expressed by James Boyd White:
[I]t is with the possibility, not the often
lamentable current conditions, that I am
concerned. Perhaps I am answering a voice, in
myself or in the culture, that says that there
is no such possibility; that law is only the
exercise of power by one person or group over
another, or only a branch of bureaucracy, or
only money-making, or only instrumental; that
it has no real and independent value for the
person or the community. Thus I ask whether we
can imagine law as an activity that in its
ideal form, at least on occasions, has true
intellectual,
imaginative,
ethical,
and
political worth. If we can, this would give us
both something to aim for and a more workable
and trustworthy ground for the criticism of
what we see around us.172
Moreover, the vision must be idealistic because
we need stories to tell that offer hope for the
future and a goal to achieve.173 As academics we
need not gloss over injustice, nor accept the
status quo blindly or uncritically. But we are
responsible for the stories we choose to tell. We
can choose to understand the efforts of our
fellow human beings sympathetically or cynically.
We can see our country as a fallen nation that is
irredeemably corrupt, or we can describe it in
terms we passionately hope it will embody. We can
view our society as inevitably divided by class,
race, ethnicity, gender, and ideology, or we can
Profession of Words, in JUSTICE AND POWER, supra note 7, at 19.
171. Milner S. Ball & James B. White, A Conversation Between
Milner Ball and James Boyd White, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 465, 468
(1996).
172. Id.
173. See RORTY, supra note 117, at 140 (describing the divide
“ between people taking refuge in self-protective knowingness about
the present and romantic utopians trying to imagine a better
future” ).
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search for stories that help us see a shared
enterprise. As postmodern theory has made us
understand, the narrative we tell is not truth;
it is a choice. I believe it is a choice we
should make solemnly and with full understanding
of both the power and potential of our tales.
POSTSCRIPT
Although this Essay was written prior to the
events surrounding the presidential election of
2000, the ideas I explore seem particularly
pressing in light of the legal controversy over
ballots in Florida and the disillusionment that
many feel about the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in
the outcome. The news coverage of the ongoing
court battles demonstrated just how far the
hermeneutics of suspicion have pervaded popular
culture, at least with respect to the legal
system. Indeed, for a full month nearly every
mention of a court or a judge was accompanied
with a phrase identifying the purported political
make-up of the court or the presumed party
affiliation of the judge. Thus, the media sent a
clear message: Regardless of what judges say or
what the ideals of the justice system demand, the
courtroom is simply another partisan political
forum
where
people
vote
their
partisan
preferences. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ultimate decision did little to temper
this suspicious attitude. Fundamentally flawed as
a matter of both logic and jurisprudence, the
opinion of the narrow five-member majority is
difficult to explain on any grounds other than
partisanship.
The result of all this is that any faith we may
have had in our legal institutions as a place
where
we
struggle,
however
imperfectly,
to
articulate useful principles for living together
or attempt to engage in constructive dialogue has
been sorely tested. As one commentator has noted,
it is possible that, especially in the wake of
the election, “ we’re all ‘crits’ now.” 174
So how do I, as one who has argued for the
generative potential of law in American culture,
respond to Bush v. Gore?175 First of all, I reject
the assumption that the partisan nature of this
decision simply made manifest that which is
174. Jeremy Paul, We’re All
(forthcoming 2001).
175. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
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present in every judicial decision. The actions
of five justices in a truly anomalous case cannot
be allowed to speak for the work of the entire
judiciary around the nation. Second, I reiterate
that the optimistic vision I have begun to
articulate here is an aspiration and therefore,
by
definition,
is
not
always
fulfilled.
Nevertheless (and perhaps this is the most
important point of my Essay), an ideal does not
lose its value simply because human beings
inevitably fall short of it. Indeed, even if we
know in advance that it cannot be reached, we
might be better off with the ideal than without
it. Both our willingness to believe in the ideal
and our dedication in striving toward it may, by
themselves, encourage us to create better social
institutions. And, if even one person who was
unheard by the political process can gain a forum
for change through the legal system, that is a
miracle
that
cannot
be
sloughed
off
as
inconsequential. We can certainly decry injustice
or disingenuous-ness in our legal system, but I
think we should resist the temptation to insist
cynically that justice is not possible or is an
incoherent category altogether. Rather, we might
wish to remember the little miracles and continue
to insist on the possibility of possibility.

